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Abstract
What is the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and the ability of the poor to
organize and influence democratic governments to improve their welfare? Political sci-
entists and economists have argued that democracies are superior to non-democracies for
improving poverty outcomes because they are advantaged with institutional mechanisms
such as universal suffrage and majority rule. Yet, there are numerous cases where democ-
racy has done little to help the poor. Through a series of essays, I examine the effects of
ethnic heterogeneity of the poor on the effect of democracy and oil revenue on poverty.
I argue that ethnic heterogeneity reduces the likelihood that poor citizens will organize
and pressure political elites to provide public goods and services that improve their gen-
eral welfare. As a result, democracy and oil revenue are less likely to improve poverty
outcomes when the poor are ethnically heterogeneous compared to being homogeneous.
The first chapter presents a cross-national study to help us understand the general
effects of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor on the effects of democracy on poverty. The
results are not statistically significant. It is not clear if the lack of significance is due to
notable endogeneity issues or that the hypothesis is wrong. For that reason, the second
chapter takes advantage of an institutional natural experiment in Indonesia to produce
more reliable results. The results show that ethnic heterogeneity of the poor significantly
affects the effect of elections on the majority of the dependent variables. In the third chap-
ter, I test the effects of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor on the effect of oil revenue among
Brazilian municipalities. The revenues local democratic governments depend upon in-
creased significantly due to the sharp increase of offshore oil royalties and world oil
prices from early 1990s to the early 2010s. This allows me to measure the effects of
ethnic heterogeneity of the poor on the effect of oil revenue on poverty at the municipal
1
level. Results suggest that ethnic heterogeneity of the poor does not significantly affect
the effect of local oil revenue on poverty outcomes in Brazil.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Han Dorussen
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Chapter 1
Introduction
What is the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and the ability of the poor to orga-
nize and influence democratic governments to improve their welfare? Political scientists
and economists alike have devoted a great deal of attention to measuring the effects of
democracy on poverty. Various arguments were used to explain why democracy is bet-
ter for the poor than non-democracies but the conventional argument is that democracies
are advantaged with institutional mechanisms that allow the poor to hold their govern-
ment more accountable in addressing their needs while non-democracies do not. The two
mechanisms universal suffrage and majority rule, work together, the argument goes, to
generate policies supporting the poor.
The most influential argument used by theorists to explain why universal suffrage
and majority rule should lead to better poverty outcomes is the Meltzer and Richard model
(1981). In a system where there is no majority rule, the dictator determines taxation and
redistribution. Under majority rule with universal suffrage, elected officials, who care
only about holding office and whose only functions are redistribution and taxation, will
follow the preferences of the voter with median income (Meltzer and Richard, 1981).
Since income is often skewed to the right, universal suffrage will likely shift the posi-
tion of the decisive voter down the income distribution. As the median income shifts to
the left of the mean income along the distribution, the decisive voter will prefer greater
redistribution; resulting in greater redistribution and welfare spending.
Other leading political economy models show that electoral competition should lead
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to greater welfare spending (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita et al.
2002). In a democracy, the poor compromise some portion of the selectorate, that is, the
group that determines whether a leader stays in power or not, while in an autocracy, they
do not. Since democratic leaders have a larger range of supporters to satisfy than authori-
tarian leaders, it is more rational for them to produce public goods instead of private ones.
This is not to imply that authoritarian leaders do not care about poverty at all but they are
less likely to do so because maintaining their political positions usually require a much
smaller selectorate (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2002; Gerring et al. 2012). Gerring et al.
(2012) notes that what matters in an authoritarian regime is that the core base such as
the military, ruling party and economic elites, is well compensated for them to maintain
power and they therefore, are unlikely to perceive that the sufferings of the masses will
threaten their control over the state.
In addition, democracies tend to accumulate other institutions that indirectly benefit
the poor such as a well formed civil society exercising political rights and civil liberties, a
free market, and a political environment that fosters free associations (Zweifal and Navia
2000; 2003). The general argumment is that the existence of political and civil rights
usually leads, over time, to a “dense network of voluntary associations, which may be
religious or secular, national or international, issue-specific or broadly pitched” (Gerring
et al. 2012; p. 3). These voluntary organizations are often important for advocating and
lobbying for services that improve the welfare of the poor. For example, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) have played an important role in promoting child vaccinations,
education and health care, treatment of HIV/AID, and other policies on promoting welfare
through effective campaigning (Gauri and Khaleghian 2002; Gauri and Lieberman 2006;
Gerring et al. 2012).
Numerous empirical studies support the previous political economy theories and
found that democracies generally invest more in education, healthcare, human capital and
avoid catastrophes such as famines (Gerring et al. 2012; Nelson 2007). Stasavage noted
that higher levels of democracy are associated with increased government spending in 44
African countries (2005). In Latin America, for countries that transition into a democ-
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racy, the level of education, health, and socially security spending generally increased
(Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001). Higher levels
of democracy are associated with better health outcomes such as infant and child mortal-
ity rates (Besley and Kudamatsu 2006; Gerring et al. 2012). Sen (1999) noted that the
worst atrocities such as mass starvation from famines have not occurred in fully-fledged
democracies but have so in authoritarian regimes.
While the conventional argument assumes that democracy would lead to greater
social welfare spending and that in turn, should improve the welfare of the poor, this re-
lationship does not necessarily occur in developing democracies (Gerring et al. 2012).
Indeed, countries where the poor are more likely to comprise the majority and should, in
theory, have the numerical weight to influence policy; public goods and services are no-
tably of low quality (Castro- Leal et al. 1999; Filmer and Pritchett 1999; McGuire 2006).
Further, Filmer and Pritchett (1999) and McGuire (2006) found that greater educational
spending did little to improve child mortality in developing countries. Castro-Leal and
other scholars (1999) noted that public spending in education and health care in several
African countries are more likely to favour the well-off than the poor. Much of the lit-
erature in developing democracies such as India or Indonesia have shown that political
leaders regularly divert government spending away from the poor to the well-off without
fearing the loss of office (Khemani and Keefer 2005). Further, Nelson (2007) conducted
a literature review on the effects of democracy on social services and found that the influ-
ence of civil society such as NGOs on national level policies were modest; though they
have been more effective at the local level.
Some scholars question the general positive effects of democracy on poverty (Gauri
and Khalegian 2002; McGuire 2006; Ross 2006; Treisman 2007). Tsai (2006; 2007)
found that at least in developing countries, higher levels of democracy were associated
with better absolute measures of poverty but were not significantly associated with better
changes in poverty; thus, implying that other factors such as globalization may explain the
huge reduction of poverty in the last 50 years rather than political institutions per se. These
contrary studies beg the question if democracy endows the poor with the institutional
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capacity to improve their welfare, then why are some democracies not producing better
outcomes?
1.1 Alternative Explanations
The literature on democracy and poverty is vast and for that reason, the theories listed
here are by no means comprehensive and instead provides a brief overview of some of the
most notable ones. To start, some scholars argue that democratic politics hinders growth-
friendly policies while authoritarian regimes can repress the growth retarding demands of
the poor and the social instabilities due to ethnic, religious and class struggles (Varshney
2000; Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu 2008). They argue that markets should come first
to promote growth and that authoritarian regimes can easily facilitate such policies while
democractic governments cannot suppress conflicts or populist politics that may under-
mine growth conducive policies (Varshney 2000). This view became popular subsequent
to the growth success stories of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore in the
1950s and 1960s (Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu 2008). As the empirical evidence show
that growth strongly affects poverty alleviation (Dollar and Kray 2002), understanding the
effects of democracy on poverty indirectly through growth matters.
Proponents of democracy and growth, however, argue that democracies tend to re-
distribute in areas conducive to growth such as in education or public goods (Acemoglu
and Robinson 2015). Moreover, the level of democracy is generally associated with other
institutions that promote growth such as greater protections of property rights, good gov-
ernance measured by the rule of law, voice and accountability, government efficiency, and
political stability, corruption and regulatory quality (Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu 2008).
Gerring et al.(2012) found that, over time, citizens in a democratic government learn to
vote in their economic interest and that the institutions such as rule of law became devel-
oped enough to promote human and political capital that are conducive to growth. Boix
(2001) argues that a certain level of economic growth is necessary for citizens to demand
for state provided goods and services such as infrastructure and education. The processes
of urbanization and industrialization due to economic growth generate the incentivies for
11
those types of public goods and services. It is beyond the scope, however, of this disser-
tation to settle debate on democracy and growth. As the relationship between political
regime types and growth is not conclusive and most of the evidence suggests that at the
very least, democracy does not harm growth (Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu 2008), I will
concern myself with the effects of democracy on poverty through greater social welfare
spending.
One analytical framework scholars have used to understand why democratic ac-
countability may not necessarily lead to quality social services is through the principal
agent problem. The problem draws from two assumptions; the first being that the prin-
cipal and agent have diverging interests and that second is that the agent has more infor-
mation than the principal which is known as information asymmetry. Due to information
asymmetry, the principal is unable to perfectly monitor and sanction the actions of the
agent, and in response, the agent has some discretion to pursue their own interests. Moral
hazard occurs when the interests of the principal and agent are not aligned, and the agent
pursues their own interests at the expense of the interests of the principal (Marquette and
Peiffer 2015).
In theories of democratic accountability, corruption is often described as a double
principal agent problem (Marquette and Peiffer 2015). In the first instance, a political
leader is defined as the ‘principal’ and they are tasked with monitoring the actions of bu-
reaucrats (agents) to hold them accountable. Without the ability to perfectly monitor their
actions, however, rationally minded bureaucrats use their discretion over resources to ex-
tract rents when the opportunity rises (Marquette and Peiffer 2015). The second principal-
agent problem occurs when public officials (bureaucrats or politicians) are treated as the
agents and the public are the principal. As the agent of the public official can ‘abuse’
their office and discretion over public services to secure private rents from members of
the public and the public is unable to perfectly monitor or hold public officials account-
able (Ugur and Dasgupta 2011). One of the consequences is that elected representatives
may not necessarily follow the preferences of the median voter.
Since a fundamental component of the principal agent problem is that informa-
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tion asymmetry between citizens and politicians or bureaucrats leads to inefficient out-
comes, an extensive literature emerged arguing that moral hazard could be ameliorated
if voters have greater access to information on politicians and their policy positions. Ra-
dio, newspapers, public education or public-information campaigns provide great sources
from which voters could draw more information. Since, poor voters are better informed
of their choices, they are more likely to punish incumbents for not providing public ser-
vices that improve their welfare when the incumbent runs for re-election (Harding and
Stasavage 2014; Ferraz and Finan 2011). For example, Besley and Burgess (2002) found
that Indian state governments are more responsive to falls in food production and crop
flood damage in areas where newspaper circulation is higher and that political elites, to
ensure re-election, tend to put greater effort in responding to voters’ needs.
There are numerous interpretations of the principal agent problem and adjusting
some of the assumptions lead to insightful analysis. Taylor-Robinson (2010), for exam-
ple, points out that the principal-agent problem is particularly an issue for poor voters.
She draws attention to the fact that previous interpretations of principal-agent model as-
sume that the principal (citizens) have uniform interests and capacities to monitor and
sanction agent’s behaviour (politicians). By relaxing these assumptions and recognizing
that the poor and rich have diverging interests and that the poor are less capable of mon-
itoring and sanctioning political elites compared to the rich, she argues that the fact that
government spending tend to benefit the rich at the expense of the poor is made more
sensible (Taylor-Robinson, 2010). The rich can influence and monitor the behaviour of
political elites because they are well-educated and informed due to their political connec-
tions. They can also sanction political elite behaviour through means beyond voting such
as campaign contributions (Taylor-Robinson 2010). The poor in comparison struggle to
influence political elites because they the lack the necessary education and information to
monitor the behaviour of political elites. Taylor-Robinson (2010) comes to a similar con-
clusion of the previous scholars and argues that educating the poor and providing more
information through an accessible, independent and free media would partially reduce the
unequal sanctioning capabilities between the poor and the rich.
13
Other scholars argue that the type of democratic institutions such as electoral rules
and nominations matter. Beath et al. (2013) argues that direct democracy can improve
political accountability by reducing the influence of local elites over the type and the lo-
cation of village projects in Afghanistan. Through a randomized controlled trial where
250 villages across Afghanistan were assigned to either determine development project
through secret-ballot referenda or by a consultation meeting, they found that secret-ballot
referenda reduce the influence of local elites over both the type and the location of village
projects (Beath et al. 2013). Iverson and Soskice (2006) argue that proportional repre-
sentation results in more redistribution because the system provides parties that represent
middle-class interests. This allows parties that represent the middle and poor classes to
form a center-left coalition to redistribute from the rich while ensuring that the left-center
coalition government will not redistribute from the middle class. By contrast, under ma-
joritarian rule, middle-class voters are more likely to support center-right parties because
the lack of a distinct middle class party implies that the middle class cannot be sure that
the poor will not set policies that redistributes from the middle to the poor (Iverson and
Soskice 2006).
There is a vast and growing literature that argues that countries should establish a
high-quality government first before democratization benefits the poor (D’Arcy and Nis-
totskaya 2015; Fukuyama 2013; Rothstein 2015). Though there is no consensus on a
definition of quality of government; two components scholars generally upon is impar-
tiality and state capacity (Fukuyama 2013; Rothstein 2015). Rothstein and Teorell (2008;
p. 170) define impartiality in the following ‘When implementing laws and policies, gov-
ernment officials shall not take anything about the citizen or case into consideration that
is not beforehand stipulated in the policy or law”. Impartiality is not a principle for de-
termining which policies are pursued since the nature of politics is partial; that is, various
interest groups representing different strands of society compete to produce polices in
their favour. For example, policies that try to reduce elderly poverty such as social secu-
rity are indeed partial politics, however, Rothstein (2015; p.58) makes the point that the
support for such programs “typically do not the civil servants tasked with implementation
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of the policies in a partial way, favouring certain elderly groups over others”.
Most scholars define state capacity as the ability of states to penetrate society and
implement their decisions (Singh and Hau 2014). State capacity can be measured by out-
puts or inputs of state activities. Outputs focus on the aggregative level, distribution and
geographic coverage of public goods and services such as policing, education, health care
or infrastructure (Singh and Hau 2014). Scholars who focus on inputs examine the orga-
nizational characteristics that underpin the ability of states to pursue their projects (Singh
and Hau 2014). An effective bureaucracy is associated with meritocratic recruitment,
standardized procedures and predictable careers, second is territorial reach, and third is
the ability of states to extract resources from society such as taxation to provide public
goods and services (Fukuyama 2013; Singh and Hau 2014).
A high-quality government is important for democratic performance because they
provide the credible enforcement that is needed for citizens to comply and contribute to
the provision of public goods and services. The lack of an impartial government nega-
tively affects the poor because citizens infer from the corrupt government officials’ be-
haviour that people in general cannot be trusted (Rothstein and Teorell; 2008). Citizens,
in turn, are likely to exhibit corrupt behaviour themselves; resulting in an inefficient al-
location of public resources (Mauro 1995; Rothstein and Teorell; 2008). D’Arcy and
Nistotskaya (2015) note that the Greek state is known for its lack of credibly enforcing
taxation and thus the fully democratic country is known for high levels of tax evasion.
Further, the lack of state capacity leads inefficient allocation of public goods and services
as it becomes difficult for citizens to discern which public official is responsible for the
provision of which public goods and services over others. Harding and Stavasage (2014),
for example, found that in democracies with weak state capacity such as those in Sub-
Saharan Africa, political leaders decided to abolish school fees in determining national
education policy because those policies are easily attributable to those leaders instead of
more effective policies such as improving the quantity and quality of teachers and school
facilities because those policies are not easily attributable to the executive office (Harding
and Stavasage 2014).
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Though the theories provide plausible explanations for democratic under-performance,
they are not sufficient. For one thing, independent press and education do not explain the
variation of social welfare spending for the poor in rich democracies. The United States
has an independent press and similar educational achievements to their European counter-
parts and yet dramatically differ in social welfare spending (Alesina et al. 2001; Alesina
and Glaeser 2004; Freedom House; 2015). Alesina et al. (2001) note that in 1995, so-
cial welfare spending was 16 percent of GDP in the United States while in Europe, it
averaged 25 percent. Second, the type of democracy such as proportional representa-
tion may partially explain the variation of social welfare spending in rich countries, the
explanation, however, does not work as well in poor ones. This important because in
advanced democracies, higher social welfare spending is associated with better poverty
outcomes (Kenworthy 1999). Iverson’s and Soskice’s (2006) model and analyses were
applied only to rich democracies and therefore it is not clear that the model works when
poorer democracies are included. Alesina et al. (2001) and Alesina and Glaeser 2004)
found that proportional representation was positively and significantly associated with
higher social welfare spending in OECD countries but the relationship became much
weaker and insignificant when the sample included non-OECD countries such as those
in Latin America.
Moreover, direct democracy may have improved political accountability and re-
source allocation in Afghanistan, however, it is not clear that the results are generalizable
(Beath et al. 2013). For example, Hinnerch and Pettersson-Lidbom (2014) found that
direct democracy led to notably less public welfare spending in early twenty-first century
Sweden. Olken (2010) provide evidence that direct democracy may have improved vil-
lager satisfaction in Indonesia but had no effect on public resource allocation. Beath et al.
(2013), themselves, acknowledge the unclear relationship of direct democracy, political
accountability and public welfare spending in other countries. Finally, previous scholars
make a compelling case that the quality of government which includes impartiality and
state capacity matters for producing effective democratic governments (Fukuyama 2013;
Keefer 2007; Rothstein and Toerell 2008). This explanation, however, begs the question
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why do some countries develop high quality government in the first place that led their
societies to have effective democratic governments while others have not? This not say
that other theories do not work nor that they are not useful (they are), rather those pre-
vious theories, alone, do not sufficiently explain the variation of democratic performance
on social welfare spending and poverty and therefore an additional theory is necessary to
complement the previous ones.
1.2 A Theory of Collective Action, Social Identity and
Ethnic Heterogeneity
Another useful analytical framework scholars developed to understand democratic perfor-
mance is collective action theory. Political economy models such as Meltzer and Richard
(1981) groundlessly assume that individual citizens will act in the interest of the group
such as their class group. Olson and Hardin, however, demonstrate that individual ra-
tionality is not sufficient to achieve collective action (Hardin 1968; Olson 1965; Sandler
2015). In his seminal work the Logic of Collective Action, Olson’s (1965) key insight is
that public policy is itself a public good, and thus is vulnerable to the free rider problem.
To get a law passed, people must overcome the free-rider problem to lobby the govern-
ment whether through campaign contributions, bribes, votes or protests. A single person
or firm is unlikely to devote the money, time and resources to lobbying if they can just
free ride on others’ lobbying efforts (Sandler 2015).
Olson notes that small groups are likely to influence government policy because the
individual benefits of collective action are more likely to outweigh the costs compared
to large groups. As group size increases, the individual benefits of collective action are
more diffused across group members and at a certain point, the individual costs outweigh
the benefits. Thus, collective action in a large group is not rational for the individual and
is unlikely to occur. To account for this, Olson argues (1965) large groups need other
material or social incentives to promote collective action. For example, Finkel and Muller
(1998) found that individuals are more likely to join a collective protest when they were
17
dissatisfied with the current provision of collective goods, held beliefs that the actions can
be successful, and beliefs in the importance of their own participation in large protests in
West Germany. Though there are notable criticisms of the assumptions of Olson’s theory
and that his insights do not apply to every single case, scholars agree that there are many
practical situations where his theory have worked and partially for that reason it remains
relevant to this day (Sandler 2015).
The ability of the poor to collectively act is particularly important for democratic
accountability and the efficient allocation of public resources. Indeed, it can be plausi-
bly argued that replacing non-performing incumbents who shirk largely depends on the
degree to which citizens can act collectively (Keefer 2011). If challengers represent the
interests of well-organized citizens, capable of collectively holding them accountable to
their commitments, challengers can credibly commit to follow better policies than the
non-performing incumbent (Keefer 2011; p. 4). Gottlieb (2015), for example, found dis-
tricts that had a credible-opposition party tend to have higher provision of public goods
in Mali. For this to occur, citizens must hold political leaders accountable to a certain
performance threshold and this to a large part depends on the beliefs of and values of
the citizens themselves. Nannicini et al. (2012) develop a formal model demonstrating
that when the majority are civic voters, incumbents that want to stay in office will tax
and provide public goods that promote general welfare of the community. In contrast,
un-civic voters vote based on promoting individual or group-specific welfare rather than
general welfare. In a situation where un-civic voters are the majority, incumbents will
adopt a ‘divide and rule’ strategy, that is, the incumbent will provide just enough rents
to the un-civic voters to form a winning-coalition rather than providing public goods that
promote general welfare.
There is a strong case to make that class cohesion of the poor is conducive to the
necessary civic capital that is needed for the poor to organize and electorally pressure po-
litical leaders on the grounds of improving their general welfare. The extensive literature
in social psychology and political economy demonstrate that group identification affects
collective action (Akerlof and Kranton 2000; Costa-Font and Cowell 2013). Society can
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be divided into social groups based on various social categorizations whether it is deter-
mined by choice such as class or language or prescribed such as gender and ethnicity
(Costa-Font and Cowell 2013). Individuals tend to nest their sense of self and thereby
their own utility to that of the group that they identify with. Further, they are more likely
to identify themselves with a group the more ‘similar’ they are to other members of that
group (Akerlof 1997; Costa-Font and Cowell 2013; Shayo 2009). To use a crude example,
the higher the fraction of people in a group that speaks my language English, the more
similar I perceive myself to be with that group.
Once identification is determined, numerous studies and experiments show that in-
dividuals tend to attribute positive utility to the well-being of members of their own group,
and little to even negative utility to that of members of other groups (Habyarimana et al.
2007; Tajfel et al. 1974; Vigdor 2004). That is, people may view themselves as benefit-
ing when fellow group members are made better off but derive no benefit or even a cost
when members of other groups experience improvements in their welfare (Habyarimana
et al. 2007). The implication of the theory is that if poor individuals identify themselves
with their class group, those members will be concerned with improving the welfare of
their class group in addition to their own. As class group identification among the poor
increases, the benefits of collective action based on class interests increases as well be-
cause increasing the utility of the group through collective action would also increase
their individual utility. Consequently, the poor will demand and vote for political leaders
that favour policies that improve their general welfare such as higher redistribution and
quality public goods and services since that those policies are more likely to improve the
general welfare of their class group.
Indeed, this phenomenon has already occurred in democracies with the largest wel-
fare state, high levels of redistribution, equality and quality of life such as those in Scan-
dinavia (Gough 2008). There is strong agreement among political scientists and histori-
ans that working-class mobilization was vital for achieving those political and economic
gains for the poor in Scandinavian democracies (Gough 2008). Gough (2008) noted that
the working-class coalition advocated for greater state economic interventions, full em-
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ployment policies, universal and extensive social policies, and greater redistribution and
economic equality. Under these conditions, democracy provided the organized poor the
institutional mechanisms from which they could influence government policy. As Gough
(2008; p.48) notes that unions’ rights were recognized in law, and parties representing
working classes were permitted organize, leading to a decisive shift in government pol-
icy.
There are many obstacles, however, that hinder class cohesion and collective ac-
tion and a notable one is ethnic heterogeneity. The reasoning is that ethnic identity may
increase the social distance between group members because the markers for ethnic iden-
tification are more observable than class. Since there are often (though not necessarily)
differentiated social networks, cultures and languages based on ethnic lines (Berge et al.
2016; Habyariman et al. 2007), it becomes difficult for individual members within the
poor to identify with one another. Shayo (2009) found evidence that higher ethnic het-
erogeneity of poor is negatively associated with preferences for redistribution among the
poor in advanced democracies. Alesina et al. (2001) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004) ar-
gue that the working class in the United States never developed the European style class
identity and large welfare states because they were ethnically heterogeneous. Luttmer
(2001) shows that in the U.S. people are more likely to express support for welfare spend-
ing if they live in a neighbourhood where the share of people of their own race among
welfare recipients is high controlling for income. Van De Walle (2003) argues that ethnic
cleavages undermine the emergence of working class identity and programmatic political
parties in Sub-Saharan Africa.
In replacing class-based organization, there is strong evidence to suggest that col-
lective action along ethnic lines in a heterogeneous society leads to worse political ac-
countability and policy outcomes for the poor. Since class cohesion has been undermined
by ethnic heterogeneity, the poor are likely to compete and vote for political leaders that
provide patronage goods and policies that favour their group while excluding other mem-
bers of the poor. Since political leaders are not pressured to provide public goods and
services that improve general welfare, those goods and services will be underprovided.
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Echoing Nannicini et al’s model (2013), those leaders, instead, will provide just enough
patronage goods to satisfy a winning coalition of ethnic groups and that coalition will
tolerate corrupt behaviour if they are satisfied. Cross-national studies have shown that
ethnic heterogeneity is positively associated with corruption (Mauro 1995; La Porta et al.
1999).
Kuijs (2000) found that ethnic heterogeneity is associated with worse health and
education outcomes (measured by infant mortality, life expectancy; and illiteracy, al-
though not with schooling), even when controlling for income, public spending and cor-
ruption across countries; concluding that higher ethnic heterogeneity undermines the
quality of public spending and increases competitive rent-seeking and patronage goods
(Kuijs 2000). Alesina et al. (1999, 2000) show that at least in the United States; higher
racial fractionalization in a jurisdiction is associated with less spending on public goods
and higher public provision of private goods, from which groups can be excluded, while
Glaeser and Saks (2006) show that higher racial fractionalization is positively associated
with corruption. In Indonesia, districts that have higher ethnic heterogeneity is associated
corrupt political behaviour (Alesina et al. 2014). Easterly and Levine (1997) found that
ethnic heterogeneity is negatively associated with school attainment and the provision of
important infrastructure such as paved roads in Africa. La Porta et al. (1999) and Alesina
et al. (2003; 2005), amongst others, show that ethnic heterogeneity is negatively associ-
ated with infrastructure quality, illiteracy and school attainment and positively correlated
with infant mortality (which is a good measure for absolute poverty). Though some schol-
ars found evidence that ethnic heterogeneity has weaker impact on public goods provision,
the clear majority of the social science literature weighs heavily on the negative effects of
heterogeneity (Gerring et al. 2015).
Where the literature is incomplete is synthesising the various strands of social iden-
tity theory, democratic accountability, ethnic heterogeneity and collective action to un-
derstand and examine the effects of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor on democratic per-
formance on poverty outcomes. That is, if ethnic heterogeneity undermines the class
cohesion that is needed for poor citizens to electorally pressure political leaders and hold
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them accountable based on improving their general welfare, then it follows democratic in-
stitutions are less likely to improve poverty outcomes when the poor are ethnically hetero-
geneous. So even if a democracy endows the poor with institutional mechanisms such as
majority rule and universal enfranchisement, that allow the poor to influence government
policy in their favour more than in a non-democracy, those mechanisms are contingent on
class cohesion and electoral pressure based on class interests. Most of the literature on
this topic examines the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on poverty or political institutions
or public policy separately excluding the intermediary effects of political institutions or
public policy (Alesina and Giuliano 2015; Alesina et al. 2005; Easterly and Levine 1997;
Fish and Kroenig 2006; Gerring et al. 2015). As a far as I can tell, the essays that com-
prise this dissertation are the first to examine the effects of ethnic heterogeneity of the
poor on the effect of political institutions and governments on poverty outcomes.
Further, most studies tend to focus on one-dimensional measures of ethnic hetero-
geneity such as the well-known ethno-linguistic fractionalization and ethnic polarization
(Alesina et al. 2005; Montavlo and Reynal-Querol 2005). Selway et al. (2011) developed
multi-dimensional variables that measure the degree to which ethnic cleavages cross-cut
other social cleavages. Baldwin and Huber (2010) and Alesina et al. (2014) measure in-
come inequality between ethnic groups. Fearon (2003) and Desmet et al. (2012) weight
various cultural heterogeneity measures by linguistic distances. None of these innova-
tions, however, directly measure ethnic heterogeneity of the poor.
The closet study to this dissertation is Shayo’s (2009), where he examined the ef-
fects of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor on voting behaviour in advanced democracies.
His formal model is highly interesting but there are some notable limitations with the
empirical analysis. For one thing, his sample is limited to 33 mostly rich democracies.
His study does not examine the effects of ethnic heterogeneity on the effect of political
institutions since it lacks counterfactuals nor does he examine the effects on poverty per
se but rather the redistributive preferences of the poor. Since his study is limited to only
advanced democracies, inferences cannot be made about poorer ones. Also, his measure
looks the share of ethnic minorities within a bottom quantile rather than the level of ethnic
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heterogeneity. It is important to note that Shayo (2009) recognizes that a more compre-
hensive study on ethnic heterogeneity on the poor is needed. The second and third essays
develop new measurements of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor using census data infor-
mation on ethnicity and private assets that proxy income at the local. As far as I can tell,
they are the first variables to directly measure ethnic heterogeneity of the poor.
The essays contained in this dissertation directly address the effects of ethnic het-
erogeneity of the poor on the effect of democratic institutions and public spending on
poverty outcomes using three different research designs. In the first two chapters, I ac-
knowledge the trade-off between external and internal validity. The first chapter uses a
cross-national study to understand the general effects of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor
on the effects of democracy on poverty. The research design, however, is susceptible to
endogeneity issues that are common among cross-national studies. For that reason, the
second chapter uses a natural experiment at the intra-country level to examine the effect
of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor on the effect of local elections on poverty and public
service delivery to the poor in Indonesia. Indonesia was chosen as a case study because it
is highly ethnically heterogeneous and the way local governments transitioned to demo-
cratic elections is plausibly considered exogenous. Consequently, the results are more
internally valid.
To address the causal mechanism developed by previous scholars that democracy
should lead to higher public spending and that in turn, should improve poverty outcomes,
the study in the third chapter examines the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on the effect of
oil revenue on poverty outcomes at the municipal level in Brazil. While a more straight
forward approach would to be examine the effects of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor on
public spending on poverty outcomes, such an approach is highly susceptible to endo-
geneity issues. It might the case that poverty increases the saliency of ethnic identity and
thereby ethnic heterogeneity and exacerbates poor governance or that poor governance
may increase ethnic heterogeneity and poverty. Therefore, it would be difficult to mea-
sure and disentangle the direction of the effect. Brazil, however, provides a unique case
study because during the 1990s and 2000s, a large portion of some local government bud-
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gets were not determined by poverty nor ethnic heterogeneity but instead by geographical
rules unrelated to local characteristics.
Indeed, some local democratic governments underwent substantial increases in their
budgets because of intergovernmental transfers of oil revenue during the period of expo-
nential increase of offshore oil output and world oil prices. Thus conditioned on ge-
ographic characteristics, oil revenue due to off-shore oil output is plausibly considered
exogenous. This allows me to more accurately measure the effects of ethnic heterogene-
ity of the poor on the effect of oil revenue on poverty at the municipal level. Although
such an approach does not directly measure the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on the ef-
fect of public spending per se, it does examine the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on the
capacity of local governments to alleviate poverty. Local government leaders can choose
to use their larger budgets to provide public goods and services that improve the general
welfare of poor or they can use to provide rents or patronage goods for their personal gain.
Further, since Brazil is in a completely different geographic region from Indonesia, the
study provides an opportunity to examine the generalizability of the hypothesis.
1.3 Overview of the Chapters
The remainder of this introduction provides overviews of the individual chapters. These
summaries provide context for the chapters by summarizing the previous literature and
highlighting the the methodological advances in the chapters.
Chapter 2: Ethnic Heterogeneity, Cross-Cutting Cleavages, and Poverty in
Democracies
In Chapter 2, I directly examines the effect of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor on
the effect of democracy on poverty outcomes at the cross-national level. I use a cross-
sectional model with OLS estimations for 76 to 140 countries to measure the effects of
democracy (measured by polity and a democracy dummy) on poverty (measured by log
of infant and child mortality rates) conditioned on varying levels of ethnic heterogeneity
of the poor. I use two variables to measure ethnic heterogeneity of the poor. One is the
well-known ethnic fractionalization variable developed by Alesina et al. (2003) which
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is the probability that two random individuals will not belong to the same ethnic group
and Selway’s (2014) ethno-income cross-cutting variable, which measures the degree to
which ethnic group I is identically distributed among other ethnic groups among class
cleavages. Due to insufficient data, these variables only approximate the variable of inter-
est. Chapters 3 and 4 specifically addresses this issue and develops a new type of variable.
It is important to note that being a cross-national study, it is very difficult to account for all
confounding variables and the discussion section addresses that. Overall, the results state
that the effects of ethnic heterogeneity on the effect of democracy on poverty outcomes
are not statistically significant.
Chapter 3: Democratic Elections, Ethnic Heterogeneity, and Poverty in In-
donesia. Evidence from a Quasi-Experimental Approach.
Although cross-national studies allow researchers to generalize, they are known
to have weak internal validity. For this reason, the second chapter addresses the same
question as the first chapter but at the intra-country level. Indonesia is an appropriate
quantitative case study because the way the country transitioned to local democratic elec-
tions is considered exogenous to local social and economic characteristics. As result, the
effect of democratic elections on poverty is plausibly considered “as if random”. More-
over, Indonesia is a highly ethnically heterogeneous country where ethnic politics plays
an important role in government policy. This study specifically addresses whether eth-
nic heterogeneity negatively affects the effect of local democratic elections on poverty
outcomes. Due to the research design, many of the confounding variables such as poor
governance among cross-national studies are accounted for. Moreover, the Indonesian
census data allows me to construct the first variables on ethno-wealth fractionalization
of the poor. Unlike the two measures used in Chapter 2, this measure directly measures
ethnic heterogeneity of the poor. Most of the results confirm the direction of the coeffi-
cients in Chapter 2, that ethnic heterogeneity of the poor negatively affects the effect of
democratic elections on poverty and are statistically significant. Though some results are
not consistent with the hypothesis, the discussion section addresses why this was so.
Chapter 4: Oil Windfalls, Ethnic Heterogeneity and Poverty in Brazil: An
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Instrumental Variable Approach.
Sometimes, when a low income-country transitions to a democracy, local govern-
ments may not have sufficient revenue to fund public goods and services. Brazil was
chosen as a case study because its municipal governments saw huge increases in their
budgets due to oil revenue transfers and oil price shocks. Offshore oil output increased
significantly from the early 1990s to early 2010s due to local oil prices being linked to
world oil prices and the discovery of offshore oil wells. Conditioned on geographic char-
acteristics oil output at the municipal level is considered exogenous. For that reason, I
instrument oil revenue by oil output to see the effect of oil revenue on poverty due to oil
output. Moreover, Brazil is also a highly ethnically heterogeneous country where ethnic-
ity is known to affect political organization. A review of Brazil’s history shows that there
is implicit racism and that individuals are less likely to associate themselves between than
within ethnic groups. The historical background provides fertile ground to examine the
effects of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor on the effect of oil revenue on poverty across
Brazilian municipalities. Similar to Chapter 3, I also use census data to create an ethno-
wealth fractionalization variable. I also take advantage of the Brazilian government’s
considerable effort on measuring various socio-economic outcomes and oil output. There
are, however, some endogeneity issues due to the way statistics were calculated that is
addressed in the discussion section. The results are overall not statistically significant.
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Chapter 2
Ethnic heterogeneity, Cross-Cutting
Cleavages and Poverty in Democracies
2.1 Introduction
Does ethnic heterogeneity of the poor undermine democratic performance on poverty
alleviation and if so, how? Political scientists and economists developed formal models to
understand the effects of democratization on redistribution and poverty. Perhaps the most
influential model Meltzer and Richard (1981), they state that democratization occurs when
political and civil rights are extended from wealthy elites to the rest of the citizenry. Under
universal enfranchisement and majority rule, the median voter with the median income
determines government policy on redistribution and taxation with the assumption that
political candidates want to stay in office and that the only functions of the government
are to redistribute and taxation. As universal suffrage expands, the income of the median
voter shifts down the income distribution. When income is unequally distributed; the
median income is less than the mean income. Since the median voter now earns a below-
average income, the voter will favour higher redistribution.
Alternatively, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and other scholars (2003) emphasized the
effects democratization on public goods provision through coalition building. The coali-
tion building process consists of sending goods to individuals with the highest affinity
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value towards the incumbent, progressively incorporating more individuals, as it becomes
necessary. In a democracy, the selectorate is composed of all citizens (Diaz-Cayeros and
Magaloni 2003). As a political regime becomes more authoritarian, the size of selec-
torate decreases. The reason a smaller selectorates is likely to bring larger security tenure
to political leaders because authoritarian leaders can target large private goods only to a
minimal winning coalition within that group. When a selectorate is very large, the mini-
mal winning coalition is also very large, so the private goods that can be provided are not
as attractive, given a budget, as compared to public goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003;
Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2003). Hence, in democracies, there is a greater emphasis on
public goods provision, although small targeted private allocations might not disappear
altogether.
While previous scholars assumed that democratization would lead to higher social
spending, and that, in turn, would enhance the welfare of the poor, there is empirical
evidence to suggest that political leaders, at least in poor democracies, regularly divert
spending away from areas that most benefit the poor or fail to implement policies that
improve the services that are known to benefit the poor such as immunization, literacy,
pre-and post-natal care, and access to safe water and sanitation (Khemani and Keefer
2005; Varshney 2000; Gerring et al. 2012). Indeed, it has been found that public spending
in developing countries, such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa, has no impact on infant and
child mortality rates and that public spending, often, do not reach the poor but the more
well off (Castro-Leal et al.1999; Filmer and Pritchett 1999). Other scholars question the
general positive effects of democracy on poverty and that previous studies may suffer
from methodological issues such as not accounting for improvements in global health
trends, unobserved heterogeneity and non-random missing data (Ross 2006).
If democracies are endowed with institutional rules that should lead to better poverty
outcomes, why are some democracies not performing better? Some scholars argue that
an important distinction should be made between young and old democracies and that
older democracies have, over time, accumulated the necessary institutions, resources and
endowments to function effectively while young democracies lack them (Gerring et al.
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2012; Keefer 2009). Gerring et al (2012) argue that in older democracies, politicians are
faced with political uncertainty and instability and as result will pursue short term goals
at the expense of long term development. Further, young democracies tend to lack quality
institutions to check corruption, rent-seeking and the inefficient allocation of public re-
sources (D’Arcy and Nistotskaya 2015, Keefer 2009; Fukuyama 2009; Rothstein 2015).
In addition, other scholars argue that information asymmetry reduce the ability of
citizens to hold politicians accountable and encourage politicians further their interests
at the expense of the poor and thus distorting incentives to provide social services to the
poor (Khemani and Keefer 2005). It is argued that broad segments of the poor might be
particularly disadvantaged in accessing information because of illiteracy, limited mobil-
ity and underdeveloped media for mass information of politicians and policy platforms
(Khemani and Keefer 2005). Thus, scholars argue that reducing information asymme-
try between citizens and politicians would increases political accountability and thereby
socio-economic outcomes. Numerous studies show that greater access to information
through education or mass media is associated with greater government responsiveness
and political accountability (Besley and Burgess 2002; Ferraz and Finan 2011; Gottlieb
2015).
Another group of scholars argue that the type of democratic institutions matter for
poverty outcomes. Iversen and Soskice (2006) provide a formal model and empirical re-
sults demonstrating that proportional representation should result in more redistribution
than majoritarian, at least in advanced democracies, by promoting separate parties for dis-
tinctive groups, it allows low and middle income voters to form a coalition to redistribute
from the rich. By contrast, under a majoritarian system, voters can usually choose gov-
ernments only from catch-all parties and, in the absence of guarantees that a center-left
government will not redistribute only to the poor, the decisive median voter opts more
often for the center-right.
Complementing the previous literature, I suggest that ethnic heterogeneity and its
negative effects on collective action based on class interests provides a plausible explana-
tion of democratic under-performance. Most studies in political history suggest a cohe-
29
sive and organized working class movements was vital for electorally pressuring political
leaders to establish large welfare states and provision of public goods and services in
advanced democracies. Ethnic heterogeneity, however, may undermine class-based orga-
nization because the increasing number of ethnic identities increases the social distance
between members within a class group and thus individual members are less likely to
identify with their class group and vote for politicians that provide broad public goods
and services that improve general welfare and will settle instead a less inefficient alloca-
tion of public resources such as targeted goods to their ethnic groups at the exclusion of
other groups which results in worse poverty outcomes. Of course, this is not to imply that
ethnic heterogeneity of the poor is the only explanation of democratic performance and
poverty outcomes, rather it is an additional one.
This paper relates to two strands of literature. The first is on the importance of eth-
nicity identity and democratic performance. Shayo (2009) provides a formal model and
empirical results that support the argument that poor citizens whom identify with their
class group are more likely to vote redistribution compared to those whom do not across
advanced democracies. Where the literature is missing is providing comprehensive study
of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor on democratic performance of which Shayo (2009)
himself admits is lacking. For one thing, Shayo (2009) only provides analysis for ad-
vanced, well established democracies and does not include poor ones. Also, Shayo (2009)
argues that saliency of national identity of the poor undermines the support for redistribu-
tion while I argue that the effects of ethnic identity, alone, is sufficient in explaining voter
behaviour.
Second, the paper relates to the abundant literature on the negative effects of ethnic
heterogeneity on poverty outcomes. The literature, for the most part, found that ethnic
heterogeneity is associated with lower provision of public goods (Easterly and Levine
1997), less participation in groups (Alesina et al. 2000) and worse health and social capi-
tal outcomes (Putnam 2007). Previous literature, however, tend to focus on one-dimension
of group identity. This is important in the context of democracies because if ethnic het-
erogeneity undermines the likelihood that the poor will mobilize and further their class
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interests, then there should be a variable that accounts for both cleavages. This paper
adds to the literature by including a different variable; ethno-income crosscuttingness
(EIC) alongside ethnic fractionalization to measure ethnic heterogeneity of the poor.
This paper begins by reviewing the literature on social identity theory and the ineffi-
cient allocation of public resources due to ethnic heterogeneity of the poor in democracies.
The next section explains the various empirical measurements for ethnic heterogeneity of
the poor. The third section, provides the data, empirical strategy, and results of the con-
ditional effects of ethnic heterogeneity on the effect of democracy on poverty. Lastly, the
discussion and conclusion sections summarize the findings, shortcomings and implica-
tions for future research.
2.2 Literature Review
A Theory of Social Identity and Collective Action
Previous literature on political economy suggests that democracy is beneficial to the poor.
Perhaps the most influential was Meltzer and Richard (1981). In the model, it states that
democratization occurs when political and civil rights are extended from wealthy elites
to the rest of the citizenry. Under universal suffrage and majority rule, the median voter
with the median income determines government policy on redistribution and taxation (as-
suming that political candidates want to stay in office and that the only functions of the
government is to redistribute and tax). As universal suffrage expands, the income of the
median voter shifts down the income distribution. When income is unequally distributed;
the median income is less than the mean income. Since the median voter now earns a
below-average income, the voter will favour higher redistribution. There is some em-
pirical evidence supporting the conclusions of the Meltzer-Richard model. Golden and
Min (2013) found that democracies, on average, fund social services more than non-
democracies. Stasavage found strong evidence that democracy has increased government
spending on education in 44 African states (2005). In Latin America, a series of studies
find health, education, and social security increased when states transition into democra-
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cies (Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001). Further,
Besley and Kudatamatsu (2006) found that democracies are associated with lower infant
mortality rates while Lake and Baum found that democracies, on average, redistribute
more than non-democracies (2001).
Some scholars, however, argue that previous cross-country studies on democracy
and poverty suffer from methodological errors and after adjusting for them, democracies
actually do little for the poor (Ross 2006). Ross argues that many previous cross-country
studies did not account for the influence of unobserved heterogeneity and possible spu-
rious correlation due to exogenous positive global health trends (2006). He also argues
that many of the samples used in previous studies have non-random missing data from
authoritarian states that have a good poverty track record. As a result, quite a few of the
previous studies were likely to be biased. Moreover, others argue that political elites in
poor democracies regularly divert spending away from areas that most benefit the poor
or fail to implement policies that improve the services that are known to benefit the poor
such as immunization, pre and postnatal care, and access to safe water and sanitation
(Khemani and Keefer 2005; Varshney 2000). Indeed, empirical studies across democra-
cies found that public spending has no impact on infant and child mortality rates (Filmer
and Pritchett 1999). Studies in Africa and India suggest that often public social spend-
ing in education and health do not reach the poor but the more well off (Castro-Leal et
al. 1999). These studies suggest that although democracies may spend more on social
services than non-democracies, it does not necessarily follow that those services actually
reach the poor.
Numerous studies emphasize that social group identity and group behaviour, in ad-
dition to individual self-interest, affects voter behaviour and redistribution in democracies
(Shayo 2009). Previous political economy models on democratization and government
policies made improbable assumptions on voters and political candidates. Particularly,
in the Meltzer and Richard Model (1981), voters and political candidates are treated as
independent entities concerned only with maximizing their own utility through income.
The problem, of course, is that voters and politicians are not independent entities without
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relationships to one another (Hall and Lamont 2013). Lupu and Pontusson (2011) rec-
ognizes the limits of that assumption and found that where the social distance between
the middle income and lower-income groups is smaller, there tends to be higher levels
of redistribution because they argue that the middle class identify more closely with the
working class. In addition, other studies found observed differences in voting patterns
and reported policy preferences across social groups such as class, race and religious af-
filiation, controlling for measures of economic self-interest (Luttmer 2001; Shayo 2009).
The extensive literature in social psychology demonstrates that people tend to iden-
tify with people that are like themselves and that once people feel part of a group, they
value the utility of their group more than the utility of people outside of their group (Tajfel
and Turner; 1974; Transue, 2007). Social identity defined by Akerlof and Kranton (2000),
as an individual’s sense of self being determined by objectively identifiable psychosocial
traits such as language, social class, ethnicity and gender and that identity is constructed
and differentiated from others by adopting preferences of that group. As individuals iden-
tify closer with a group, the social distance between members reduces and as result, they
are less likely to make a distinction between their own and others’ welfare and more
likely to view each other as having common goals (Shayo 2009; Singh 2015). An im-
portant implication of this theory is that a cohesive and potent political movements occur
when members have a strong social identity.
Applying social identity theory, there is a reasonable case to make that if the poor
politically organize based on their class interests, they would pressure political leaders a
great deal more forcefully (Varshney 2000). Class, at least in economic terms, is defined
by the position of a group within an income distribution. To improve the welfare of their
group, the poor, would vote for higher levels of redistribution and provisions of public
goods and services such as education and healthcare. Since there are various groups com-
peting to influencing political leaders’ policy decisions and there are limited government
resources, the poor must organize and electorally pressure political leaders to influence
government policy in their favour. Otherwise, a more politically organized group may
pressure and influence political leaders to provide government resources to their group
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at expense of the poor such as economic elites. For successful organization to occur, the
poor would first need to identify with their class group to form a cohesive political group
who votes for political leaders that favour high levels of redistribution and broad public
goods and services and electorally punish those leaders whom do not. One of the most
potent political movements that resulted in democracies with high levels of redistribu-
tion, welfare state and provision of the broad public goods and services was because of
successful political organization of the poor (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Gough 2008).
Though working class mobilization occurred prior to democratization in Europe; when
democracy was established, unions’ rights were recognized in law, and parties represent-
ing working class and other subordinate interests were permitted to organize and vote,
leading to a decisive shift in the class balance of power (Gough 2008, p.8). Working-
class organizations had substantially more leverage to counter the opposing interests of
business and economic elites (Gough 2008, p. 48).
Most democracies, however, have not developed a working-class movement as co-
hesive and influential as the ones in 19th and early 20th centuries Europe and a major
hindrance for that is ethnic heterogeneity. For example, the United States did not de-
velop a welfare state as extensive as the one in Europe because of the absence of a large
and cohesive working class movement (Alesina and Glaeser 2004). Though individuals
may not necessarily identify and form groups based on ethnic cleavages, scholars suggest
that individuals often do so because the visibility of ethnic identity allow individuals to
identify easier along ethnic cleavages than say class (Alesina et al. 2005; Fearon 1999).
The implication of the social identity theory is that as the poor become more ethnically
heterogeneous, the increasing number of ethnic identities is likely to increase the social
distance between members of the poor and as a result, they are less likely to identify with
their class group. Since individuals care about enhancing the welfare of the group with
whom they most identify with, the poor are less likely to care about improving the welfare
of their class group when they are ethnically heterogeneous. Thus, the poor are less likely
to politically organize and vote for politicians that favour the provision of broad public
goods and services.
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There is considerable evidence showing that higher ethnic heterogeneity under-
mines class identification and preferences for redistribution and the provision of broad
public goods. Luttmer (2001) shows that people are more likely to express support for
welfare spending if they live in a neighbourhood where the share of people of their own
race among welfare recipients is high and found this to be true regardless of the economic
class of the respondents. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) argue that a European style work-
ing class identity never materialized in the United States because the demographics were
ethnically heterogeneous due to waves of immigration. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) found
evidence that, after examining a range of factors that may explain the large difference
welfare state sizes in Europe and United States, higher ethnic heterogeneity in the United
States relative to Europe explained 50 percent of the variation. Alesina and La Ferrara
(2000) and Alesina et al. (1999) found further evidence that higher ethnic heterogene-
ity is negatively associated with redistribution and the provision of public goods such as
education roads, sewers and trash pick-up in the U.S.
Ethnic heterogeneity of the poor could potentially undermine the provision of broad
public goods and services in other well-established democracies with strong welfare states
such as those in western Europe. Shayo (2009) noted that the increase and presence of
immigration has been attributed as the most common explanatory factor for the rise of
right wing extreme parties in Europe. Since immigration of foreign workers affects pri-
marily the composition of the poorer segments of society, it is likely to affect the identity
of members of the working class (Shayo 2009). Soroka et al. (2006) found evidence of
a negative association between higher flows of immigration and social spending across
OECD countries from 1970 to 1998. To improve internal validity, Dahlberg et al. (2012)
used a natural experiment of a Swedish national of placing refugees in municipalities
from 1985 to 1994 and found that native Swedes were less likely to support redistribution
in areas that had higher levels of immigrants across income levels.
A major consequence of weak class solidarity and high ethnic identification among
the poor in democratic polities is the inefficient distribution of public resources. When
allocation and distribution of public resources are based primarily on the political calcu-
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lation to maintain the political support (e.g. votes or campaign donations) from specific
groups in specific geographical locations at the exclusion of other groups rather than pro-
moting general welfare, dead weight losses occur and thus outcomes may depart substan-
tially from any measure of economic or social efficiency (Hicken and Simmons 2008).
Nannicini et al. (2012) provide a formal model showing that when citizens are not co-
operating and voting based on general welfare, they are more willing to tolerate corrupt
political behaviour and politicians, in turn, will provide enough patronage goods and pri-
vate transfers to keep their winning coalition satisfied and will underprovide broad public
goods and services. For example, in Italy and India politicians have maintained nonmer-
itocratic, ineffective bureaucracies despite numerous calls for reform. These ineffective
bureaucracies persist because they produce many more opportunities for raising neces-
sary campaign funds, intervening in the bureaucracy on behalf of constituents and using
government jobs to reward supporters (Hicken and Simmons 2008).
There is extensive evidence that suggests that parties based on ethnicity, unlike,
mass-class based parties, do not advance a political programme for improving the gen-
eral welfare of society (Gunther and Diamond 2003). Scholars argue that the goals and
strategies of ethnic parties are to use public resources to enhance the welfare and interests
of an ethnic group or a winning coalition of ethnic groups at the expense of other groups
(Gunther and Diamond 2003). Lacking any programmatic appeal or ideological agenda,
ethnic parties tend to mobilize pre-existing clientelistic relations. For example, Van de
Walle (2003) noted that ethnic heterogeneity undermined the emergence of class based
movements of the poor and programmatic political parties when sub-Saharan African
countries democratized. What resulted instead was the application of pre-existing ethnic
patron-clientelist networks to democratic elections. That is, individuals were willing to
exchange votes or other political support for political elites in exchange for patronage
goods such as public sector employment or local infrastructure projects, private transfers
that were targeted to their co-ethnics in specific geographical locations at the expense of
other ethnic groups. Easterly and Levine (1997) found that higher ethnic heterogeneity is
negatively with broad-based public goods and services such as low quality schools, poor
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roads and insufficient electricity grids in Sub-Saharan Africa.
To sum the relating previous literature, if the poor do not form a class identity
and electorally pressure political leaders based on improving the general welfare of their
class group because of ethnic heterogeneity, then political leaders have little incentive to
provide broad public goods and services to improve the general welfare of the poor. Con-
sequently, public goods and services will be underprovided and the poor will have worse
welfare outcomes. So even if democracies are endowed with the institutional mecha-
nisms (i.e. enfranchisement, freedom of speech and assembly, majority rule) that provide
the mechanisms by which the poor could influence political leaders, the effectiveness
of those mechanisms is contingent on the poor identifying within their class group and
voting based on improving the welfare of their class group. If the poor are ethnically
homogeneous, they are more likely to identify within their class group and electorally
pressure their democratic government to improve their general welfare. Since political
leaders want to stay in office, they will comply and provide public goods and services that
will improve the welfare of the poor. Thus, there will be better poverty outcomes. From
this, I formulate the following hypothesis:
H1: Higher ethnic heterogeneity of the poor negatively affects the effect of democ-
racy on poverty
Measurements of Ethnic heterogeneity
Most previous literature use some form of the ethno-linguistic fractionalization (EF) vari-
able when analyzing how ethnicity affects poverty. Although the ELF variable paved the
way for ethnicity and poverty research; EF on its own is not sufficient in measuring the
variable of interest. It broadly measures the probability that two random individuals will
belong to two different ethnic groups. The variable is constructed using the Herfindahl
index:
EF = 1−
G∑
i=1
s2ij (2.1)
The variable subtracts the sum square of the share of ethnic groups over the total
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population within a country from 1. Where sij is the share of ethnic group i over the
total population of the country j and G is the number of ethnic groups. For any number
of groups, the measure increases as groups become more equal in size (Huber 2012). If
all groups are of equal size, then the society with a larger number of groups possesses a
higher index of fractionalization. The variable is continuous with 0 equates with complete
ethnic homogeneity while 1 is complete heterogeneity.
This measure, however, does not account for other social cleavages that may affect
how the poor cooperate. Most pertinent, the EF measure does not account for how ethnic
cleavages are structured in relation to class cleavages. Indeed, it is possible to have a
situation where two countries have the same EF score but differ on how that score carries
within class groups. For example in country A;
%100
Red
Rich
%100
Blue
Poor
There are two ethnic groups; each comprising 50 percent of the population. The
ethnic groups are represented by the colors Blue and Red. All of the Blue are rich while
all of the Red are poor. In other words, class does not overlap with ethnicity. The EF
score is 0.5 in country A. In country B, however;
Red Blue
%50
Rich
50 Rich
%50
Poor
50 Poor
There are also two ethnic groups represented by the colors Red and Blue; each
compromising 50% of the population. The EF score is still 0.5. Unlike country A, the
two ethnic groups are not reinforced by class cleavages. Instead, the two class cleavages
-poor and rich- are evenly distributed among the ethnic groups. Half of the individuals in
both the Red and Blue groups are rich and the other half are poor.
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This difference of how ethnic cleavages are distributed within class groups relates
to the variable Ethno-Income Cross-cuttingness (EIC). Ethno-Income Cross-cuttingness
measures how ethnicity is structured in relation to income cleavages (Gubler and Selway
2012). According to Guber and Selway (2012), cross-cuttingness is defined as the degree
group I on cleavage X is identically distributed among groups on cleavage Y with all other
groups on cleavage X. Pure cross-cuttingness occurs when groups on the first cleavage are
identically distributed among groups on a second cleavage. With regard to the previous
examples, country B represents a pure cross-cutting country because the two ethnic groups
Red and Blue have equal proportions of rich and poor and the rich and poor have equal
proportions of Red and Blue. In other words, income cross-cuts ethnicity because half of
all the Reds are rich, as are half of all Blues, and half of both ethnic groups are poor. In
country A, however, ethnic groups are not identically distributed across class cleavages.
All of the Red are poor while all of the Blue are rich, that is, both cleavages; ethnicity and
class, reinforce each other.
Cross-cutting cleavages are important for how the poor mobilize because if class
cleavages reinforce ethnic cleavages then there should be greater demand for pro-poor
policies. In country A, since all of the poor are Red, there is no ethnic heterogeneity
within the poor. Ethnicity is not likely to hinder collective action to further the welfare
interests of the poor. For this reason, Ethno-Income cleavages will be the independent
variable along with ethnic fractionalization.
2.3 Data and Methodology
Dependent Variables
I use two measurements for poverty; the log of infant mortality rate; which describes the
number of live-born infants who fail to reach the age of one per one thousand births; and
the log of child mortality rate, which describes the number of live-born infants who fail
to reach the age of five per one thousand births (World Bank 2015). Infant and child
mortality rates have been recognized as good indicators because they reflect a wide array
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of factors that characterize extreme poverty: lack of access to clean water and sanitation;
indoor air pollution; crowding; low education and literacy rates among mother; diets
that have sufficient caloric intake and are deficient in essential micro-nutrients; greater
vulnerability to disease; and low income (Ross, 2006).
In analysing the causes of infant and child mortality rates it is important to account
for the bounded, uneven nature of the relationship (Gerring et al. 2012). It is quite
likely the case that it is easier to lower IMR and CMR from high levels than from low
levels and therefore, the increments of IMR and CMR should not be treated as absolute
equal changes. To account for the possibility of a non-linear relationship and since all
the values are all positive, I log transform infant and child mortality rates.Variables are
compiled from the World Bank Development indicators dataset. The World Bank has a
large dataset compromising all the relevant years. The institution bases its estimated on a
combination of data from government registries and independent demographic and health
surveys.
Independent Variables
There are two measures included for ethnic heterogeneity of the poor. The first is ethnic
fractionalization. Ethnicity is defined as a combination of racial and linguistic character-
istics. However, the variable ethnic fractionalization emphasizes more on racial charac-
teristics rather than linguistic while the variable linguistic fractionalization is solely based
on linguistic differences. Alesina et al. (2003) argued that ethnicity and language are two
different concepts and produces different results. Thus it would appropriate to separate
them and form two different variables. Ethno-linguistic fractionalization variable devel-
oped by Easterly and Levine (1997) measures the probability that two randomly drawn
individuals drawn of a unit of observation belong to two different groups. The difference
however is that the measure makes no distinction between ethnicity and language. This
paper focuses particularly on the effects of ethnicity on the effect of democracy on poverty
and thus I believe that Alesina et al’s measure is more appropriate. The variable will be
measured by the ethnic fractionalization index developed by Alesina (2003). The data can
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be accessed from the MacroData Guide website.
EIC is a crosscuttingness variables that measure the degree to which ethnic or lin-
guistic group I is identically distributed among groups on class cleavages with all other
ethnic or linguistic groups (Gubler and Selway 2012). It is a continuous variable; rang-
ing from 0 (no cross-cuttingness) to 1 (pure crosscuttingess). The variable is operational-
ized using Cramer’s normalization of chi-square test statistic for independence from basic
cross-tabular analysis (Gubler and Selway 2012). The variable is compiled from Guber
and Selway’s cross-national dataset that of crosscuttingness variables. The information
for the dataset comes from several national representative surveys: the World Values Sur-
vey, the Eurobarometer, the Afrobarometrer, the Latin American Public Opinion Project,
the Asian Barometer, the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, and a survey con-
ducted by the World Health Organization (Selway 2011). The surveys allow individuals
to identify themselves as belonging to an ethnic, linguistic, racial, or religious group, as
living in a certain region, and as having a certain income (Gubler and Selway 2012). Most
countries’ EIC score were composed as an average from two or more surveys.
There are multiple measures for democracy. One is based on the Polity IV dataset,
which contains 0-10 measures of Democracy and Autocracy. I will use the POLITY vari-
able which combines the two measures to produce a 21 point scale. In the Polity IV
dataset, Democracy is defined as having three essential, interdependent elements. One is
the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective
preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institution-
alized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of
civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation (Polity
IV, 2013. The other measure developed by Boix et al.’s (2012) measure regime type as a
dichotomous variable; 1 defined as being a Democracy and 0 as a non-Democracy. The
measure covers 219 countries observed between 1800 or the year of independence or the
first for which data on economic growth were available to 2007 or last year for which data
on economic growth were available (Boix et al. 2012).
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Control Variables
The control variables were selected based on controlling for other factors that may explain
the variation of global poverty outcomes while not undermining the relevant intervening
mechanisms that differentiate the effects of democracies and non-democracies on poverty
outcomes. It is plausible to argue that democracy leads to more social welfare spending
in education and healthcare and that in turn, generally leads to better infant and child
mortality outcomes. If education and healthcare are controlled for, then the substantive
and statistical significance of democracy is unnecessarily reduced and leads to biased
estimates. Thus, the model does not control for factors that may reflect intervening mech-
anisms of political institutions on poverty outcomes such as education, sanitation, income
inequality, or medical services (Ross 2006).
Income is included because most, if not all cross-country studies show that income
has a strong effect on infant and child mortality (Ross 2006). It is not clear that democracy
causes higher incomes or that the relationship is explained by the fact that countries with
higher incomes tend to democratize. At the very least, democracy generally does not seem
to harm income. Income is log transformed because it is likely the case that the effect of
income on IMRs and CMRs from low levels of income is greater than from high levels;
that is, there are diminishing marginal returns to income (Lipton and Ravillion 1995).
Similar to the reasons for transforming the dependent variable, log transformations are
seen to be an appropriate transformation to account for the possible non-linear relation-
ship, difficulty of interpretation due to positively skewed data, and that all the values of
income are positive.
Population density is included because institutions may find it harder to provide
health care, education, sanitation, and other social services to the poor when they are
widely scattered in rural areas (Balk et al. 2004; Ross 2006). Population density is
log transformed because there is some evidence to suggest that the effect on IMRs and
CMRs from highly sparse geographic areas is greater on poverty than the effect from a
moderately sparse area (Balk et al. 2004). Though the functional form is not known a
priori, it may imply a non-linear relationship. Further, population density is highly right
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skewed which makes interpretation of untransformed data difficult as the arithmetic mean
is no longer the measure of central tendency while a log transformation spreads out the
distance between small values and compresses the distances between large values and the
anti-log of the log transformed data is the geometric mean which is a more appropriate
measure of central tendency for highly skewed data (Oliver et al. 2008). In addition, the
values are all positive.
Regional dummies were included to account for possible unobserved heterogeneity
across regions. The data for all the control variables are collected from the World Bank
(2015).
Empirical Strategy
I analyse the effects of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor on democracy and poverty using
a cross-sectional model with OLS estimation for 76 to 140 countries1:
Povertyi = a+B1Democracyi+B2EFi+B3(Democracyi∗EFi)+B4Controlsi+ei (2.2)
I model Poverty in country i as a function of independent variables Democracy
and EF , the interaction term Democracy ∗ EF as well as the constant a, Controls and
error term, ei. It is important to state that an interaction model differs substantially from
an additive one. In an additive model, coefficients describe the average unconditional
effects of the relevant independent variable on the dependent variable, regardless of the
level of the other independent variables(Friedrich 1982; Brambor et al. 2006). In an inter-
action model, however, the marginal effects of the constituent independent variable (i.e.
independent variable that is included in the interaction term) on the dependent variable
is conditional on the level of the other constituent independent variable and vice versa.
The coefficient B1 states the conditional marginal effect of Democracy on poverty when
EF is equal to 0 and the coefficient B2 states the conditional marginal effect of EF on
Poverty when Democracy is equal to 0. The coefficient B3 of multiplicative interaction
term Democracy ∗ EF states the conditional effect of Democracy on Poverty with a
1The summary statistics of all the variables are in the appendix labelled Table 3
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one unit change in EF or alternatively the conditional effect of EF on Poverty with
a one unit change in Democracy. Relevant to the hypothesis, the coefficients B1 and
B3 provide information for the hypothesis that at higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity,
democracy will be associated with worse poverty outcomes.
It is important to note that the model uses OLS to estimate a cross sectional model
rather than panel data. Panel data would offer some advantages over a cross-sectional
model. They can be more informative, gives information on time-ordering events, and
(most relevant advantage to this paper) controls for individual unobserved heterogeneity
(e.g. cultural factors, national policies). Since the model is analyzing a large number of
countries, there are likely to be unobserved confounding factors. Panel data could control
for those time invariant unobserved variables as they do not vary within a country us-
ing fixed effects. It is, however, not possible to use panel data because of the variables of
interest; ethnic fractionalization and ethno-wealth cross-cuttingness. Ethnic fractionaliza-
tion and cross-cuttingness indices are generally treated as time invariant in cross-country
regressions, based on the fact that group shares are sufficiently stable that changes only
have minor impacts on fractionalization measures (Alesina et al. 2003; Fearon 2003)2.
Within a 20 to 30 year horizon, Alesina et al. argue that it is reasonable to treat ethnic
fractionalization as time-invariant variable (2003). Precisely because ethnic fractionaliza-
tion is largely time invariant, it would take an inordinate the amount of work to provide
data for each year for each country, and the possibility of unavailable data; scholars so far
have not produced comprehensive panel data. Since there is not sufficient panel dataset,
a cross sectional model was used instead.
Results
Table 2.1 shows that the results that at higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity, democracy is
associated with worse infant and child mortality. The results, however, are not statistically
significant at the 95 percent confidence levels. In the first two columns, the negative coef-
ficients on Polity indicates that the effect of increasing a country’s Polity score reduces
2This does not follow that fractionalization is an exogenous variable but that it is treated as one
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Table 2.1: Democracy, Ethnic Heterogeneity and Poverty
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log IMR Log CMR Log IMR Log CMR
EF −0.131 −0.0377 0.0758 0.145
(0.261) (0.284) (0.210) (0.234)
Polity −0.0216 −0.0219
(0.012) (0.012)
Polity*EF 0.0343 0.0322
(0.018) (0.019)
Democracy −0.209 −0.215
(1.75) (0.181)
Democracy*EF 0.375 0.358
(0.270) (0.286)
Log Income −0.473∗∗ −0.505∗∗ −0.481∗∗ −0.514∗∗
(0.048) (0.045) (0.044) (0.043)
Log Density −1.02∗∗ −0.0994∗∗ −0.101∗∗ 0.100∗∗
(0.028) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029)
Constant 7.608∗∗ 8.034∗∗ 7.550∗∗ 7.989∗∗
(0.434) (0.420) (0.405) (0.395)
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 136 136 140 140
R2 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.90
Standard errors are in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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infant and child mortality rates in completely ethnically homogenous countries (ethnic
heterogeneity equals zero). The negative effect, though, attenuates as ethnic heterogene-
ity increases. This is indicated by the positive coefficient on EF ∗ Polity. In columns
3 and 4 that include regressions with the dummy variable, the negative coefficients of
democracy indicate that countries changing from non-democracy to democracy reduces
infant and child mortality rates when they are completely ethnically homogenous. The
negative effect also attenuates as ethnic heterogeneity increases. All the regressions have
notably high R-Squared; stating that they explain at least 90 percent of the variation of
infant and child mortality rates. To provide further information on the conditional effects
of democracy on infant and child mortality rates across varying levels of ethnic hetero-
geneity, marginal effect graphs of the relationships are produced below.
Figure 2.1: Marginal Effects of Democracy, Ethnic Heterogeneity and Poverty
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Figure 2.1. shows that the conditional effects of democracy on infant and child mor-
tality rates at varying levels of ethnic heterogeneity. The slopes in graphs are consistent
with the hypothesis but they are not statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence
levels for any level of ethnic heterogeneity. On the upper two quadrants, when ethnic
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heterogeneity is less than 0.6, the effect of increasing a country’s Polity score reduces
infant and child mortality rates. When ethnic heterogeneity is between 0.7 and 0.9, the
effect of increasing a country’s Polity score increases infant and child mortality rates. On
the lower two quadrants, when ethnic heterogeneity is less than 0.5, the effect of a coun-
try changing from a non-democracy to a democracy decreases infant and child mortality
rates. When ethnic heterogeneity is between 0.6 and 0.9, the effect of a country changing
from a non-democracy to a democracy increases infant and child mortality rates. Previ-
ously stated, since ethnic heterogeneity is not sufficient in operationalizing the variable of
interest, another set of regressions were implemented to examine the conditional effects
of ethno-income crosscuttingness on the effect of democracy on poverty.
Table 2.2 shows that at higher levels of ethno-income crossuttingness, democracy
is associated with worse infant and child mortality. The results, however, are not statis-
tically significant. In the first two columns, the negative coefficients on Polity indicates
that the effect of increasing a country’s Polity score reduces infant and child mortality
rates in countries where ethno-income crosscuttingness equals 0. The negative effect,
though, attenuates as ethno-income crosscuttingness increases. This is indicated by the
positive coefficient on EIC ∗Polity. In columns 3 and 4 that include regressions with the
dummy variable, the positive coefficient on Democracy indicates that countries changing
from non-democracy to democracy reduces infant and child mortality rates when ethno-
income crosscuttingness equals 0. The negative effect also attenuates as ethno-income
crosscuttingness increases. All the regressions also have notably high R-Squared; stating
that they explain at least 89 percent of the variation of infant and child mortality rates.
The coefficients of Polity and Democracy are meaningnless as the minimum level of
ethno-income crosscuttingness is 0.538 and not 0. To provide further information on the
conditional effects of democracy on infant and child mortality rates across the relevant
levels of ethno-income crosscuttingness, marginal effect graphs of the relationships are
produced below.
Figure 2.2. shows the conditional effects of democracy on infant and child mortality
rates at varying levels of ethno-income crosscuttingness. The slopes in the graphs are con-
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Table 2.2: Democracy, Ethno-Income Crosscuttingness and Poverty
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log IMR Log CMR Log IMR Log CMR
EIC −3.127 −2.976 −3.700 −3.577
(2.24) (2.79) (2.08) (2.67)
Polity −0.0696 −0.0637
(0.11) (0.11)
Polity*EIC 0.0763 0.0680
(0.13) (0.15)
Democracy −1.801 −1.713
(1.79) (2.25)
Democracy*EIC 2.036 1.908
(2.14) (2.66)
Log Income −0.494∗∗ −0.526∗∗ −0.507∗∗ −0.539∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Log Density −0.0899 −0.0945 −0.0905 −0.0948
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant 10.35∗∗ 10.71∗∗ 10.94∗∗ 11.32∗∗
(2.08) (2.52) (2.02) (2.51)
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 76 76 76 76
R2 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.89
Standard errors are in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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Figure 2.2: Marginal Effects of Democracy, Ethno-Income Crosscuttingness and Poverty
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sistent with the hypothesis but are not statistically significant at any level of ethno-income
crosscuttingness. On the upper two quadrants, when ethno-income crosscuttingness is at
the minimum level 0.538, the effect of increasing a country’s Polity score reduces infant
and child mortality rates. When ethno-income crosscuttingness is around 0.9 and higher,
the effect of increasing a country’s Polity score increases infant and child mortality rates.
On the lower two quadrants, when ethno-income crosscuttingness is at the minimum level
0.538, the effect of a country changing from a non-democracy to a democracy decreases
infant and child mortality rates. When ethno-income crosscuttingness is around 0.9 and
higher, the effect of a country changing from a non-democracy to a democracy increases
infant and child mortality rates.
2.4 Discussion
The results largely show that the effects of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor on the effect
of democracy on poverty outcomes are not statistically significant. This may, however,
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partially be a result of several endogeneity issues. For one thing, the model only tested
the hypothesis for 76- 140 countries. It is possible by having full coverage that the re-
sults could be different. Unfortunately, the survey data on the relevant variables EF and
EIC made the coverage of the model limited. The model also suffers the risk that unob-
served heterogeneity could lead to spurious results. Considering the sample is a range of
countries, there is most likely going to be unobservable factors such as culture or colonial
legacy. If culture leads to both democracy and low levels of poverty, or ethnic hetero-
geneity of the poor and low levels of poverty, then the inability to control for these factors
could bias the results. However, because the variables of interest; EF and EIC were
treated as time invariant, it was impossible to find panel data which would have better ad-
dressed this research design issue. Regional dummies were included to control for some
of the unobserved heterogeneity but more is needed to deal with these issues.
The other issue is reverse causality. The hypothesis states that ethnic heterogeneity
negatively affects the likelihood that democracies reduce poverty. It is possible, however,
that higher levels of poverty increase ethnic heterogeneity by increasing the saliency of
ethnic identity which may lead to poor governance rather than ethnic heterogeneity nega-
tively affecting governance which leads to worse poverty outcomes. Within this model, it
is not clear which way the direction is going. Another notable issue is that ethnic hetero-
geneity and ethno-income crosscuttingness do not directly measure ethnic heterogeneity
of the poor. Ethnic fractionalization is a good measure of increasing ethnic heterogeneity
of a given society but does not account for class cleavages while ethnic-income cross-
cuttingness does not directly measure for heterogeneity of the poor. This is because it is
difficult to find country level surveys that contain questions on both ethnicity and income.
At best, these measures indirectly account for ethnic heterogeneity of the poor.
The endogeneity issues of reverse causality, unobserved heterogeneity and measure-
ment error imply that the inclusion of inter-country or intra-country studies would help
investigate the relationship more accurately. There are natural experiments where the
introduction of political institutional change is considered exogenous and thereby ame-
liorate some of the issues of unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality. For example,
50
numerous studies exploiting the exogenous timing of local elections in Indonesia and to
examine the its effects on various socio-economic outcomes. In addition, some coun-
tries such as India, United States or Indonesia have high quality government data that
allows one to accurately measure both income and ethnic fractionalization; allowing one
to construct an ethno-fractionalization. These type of research studies, greatly help schol-
ars accurately measure the conditional effects of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor on the
effect of democracy on poverty outcomes.
In addition to the empirical concerns, there are notable limitations to the hypothesis
that should be addressed. The hypothesis states that if the poor organized based on their
class interests, they are more likely electorally pressure politicians to provide broad based
public goods and services to improve their welfare. The hypothesis, however, excludes
two important political groups; the middle class and the rich. Similar to the analytical
framework developed by Iverson and Soskice (2006), if the middle class form a coalition
with the poor to vote in the interest of both groups, then majority rule should lead to
better policy outcomes for the poor. If the middle class, however, form a coalition with
the rich instead, then collective action of the poor may not matter much. In the context of
social identity theory, this implies that reduces the social distance between the poor and
the middle classes are also important as well within the poor. This is likely to be a greater
concern within rich democracies, as the middle class tends to compromise the electoral
majority. While in poor democracies, the poor are more likely to be compromise the
electoral majority and thus collective action within the poor could be argued to be more
important because if they were to form based on their class interests, they would have the
numerical weight to greatly influence government policy in their favor.
2.5 Conclusion
To summarize, in this cross-national study, ethnic heterogeneity of the poor does not sig-
nificantly affect the effect of democracy on poverty. Despite the important econometric
concerns and the limitations of the theory, it is interesting to note that the direct of the
relevant coefficients in all the regressions with different measurements of ethnic hetero-
51
geneity and democracy are consistent with the hypothesis. That is, at higher levels of
ethnic heterogeneity and ethno-income crosscuttingness, democracy is associated with
worse poverty outcomes.
It is not clear whether the lack of statistically significant relationships for the hy-
pothesis is due to the implausibility of hypothesis or measurement error or other endo-
geneity issues that are generally susceptible to cross-national studies. Particularly, better
measurements of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor at the cross-national level are needed to
better understand the relationship. Previously stated, neither the ethnic heterogeneity nor
cross-cutting cleavage measurements are ideal. Intra-country studies, however, are likely
to solve this issue. Countries such as Indonesia or United States have adequate census
data with information on both ethnicity, income or private assets that could be used to
proxy income to construct ethnic heterogeneity within class group measurements. Such
innovations would improve internal validity and our understanding of the effects of ethnic
heterogeneity of the poor.
Finally, there may be other types of identities that hinder collective action of the
poor besides ethnicity. Other scholars have noted the importance of linguistic differences
measured by the distances between languages from language trees (Desmet al. 2009). If
languages between poor citizens are vastly different, it is likely that the poor cannot form
a class identity nor organize effectively due to high communication costs. Studies that
look to the effects of linguistic differences could provide light on how language policies
could be used to mitigate the negative effects of heterogeneity and to create more effective
institutions.
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2.6 Appendix
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Log IMR 3.387 1.06 0.993 5.088 183
Log CMR 3.667 1.162 1.308 5.768 183
Ethnic 0.441 0.258 0 0.930 184
EIC 0.867 0.063 0.538 1 80
Polity 11.372 7.495 0 20 148
Dem 0.523 0.501 0 1 174
Log Income 7.601 1.61 4.69 11.235 169
Log Pop Den 3.954 1.529 0.324 9.778 182
Western 0.136 0.344 0 1 154
Eeurop 0.169 0.376 0 1 154
Lamerica 0.149 0.358 0 1 154
Ssafrica 0.279 0.45 0 1 154
Asia 0.143 0.351 0 1 154
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Chapter 3
Democratic Elections, Ethnic
Heterogeneity and Poverty in
Indonesia: Evidence from A
Quasi-Experimental Approach
3.1 Introduction
To what extent does ethnic heterogeneity of the poor undermine the effectiveness of lo-
cal democratic elections on poverty alleviation? Theoretical model predicts that electoral
accountability should improve the welfare of the poor due to majority rule and universal
enfranchisement (Meltzer and Richard 1981). The general intuition of electoral account-
ability is that politicians are rational and have a desire to stay in public office and because
of this desire, competitive elections pressure them to improve their performance. Due to
majority rule and universal enfranchisement, the poor can use elections to discipline in-
cumbents by threatening them the loss of office for inadequate performance (Golden and
Min 2013).
Some scholars argue that elections at the local level is particularly important be-
cause local governments are in closer proximity to citizens than central governments,
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and as a as result local leaders are held more accountable to the citizenry (Bardhan and
Mookherjee 2005). Seabright (1996) argues that local citizens are often able to make
accurate inferences concerning the accountability of local government officials, owing
to their knowledge and observation of local conditions and behaviour of these officials.
Consequently, local elections form an ‘incomplete contract’ which permits citizens to
provides information of the potential electoral consequences to corrupt and incompetent
officials by refusing to re-elect them (Bardhan and Mookjerjee 2005).
Local elections, however, may not necessarily benefit the poor. Notably in de-
veloping democracies, local governments may be subject to elite capture and routinely
direct public resources intended for certain classes of recipient (i.e., the poor) to specific
other groups (i.e., local elites) without suffering loss of office (Bardhan 2002; Bardhan
and Mookherjee 2005; Golden and Min 2013; Khemani and Keefer 2005). Bardhan and
Mookerjee (2000) argue that the poor are disadvantaged in allocation of public resources
because of their lack of political information and that local elites provide campaign con-
tributions or other resources to local political candidates, that the poor cannot. The out-
comes that Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005) observe include the diversion of government
resources meant for the poor into the hands of local elites.
Other scholars argue that since most developing countries have been democratic for
a relatively short period compared to their rich counterparts, they are likely to be subject
to corruption and pre-existing patron-clientelist networks (Keefer 2009; Fukuyama 2013;
Gerring et al. 2012). Their arguments build on the fact that in a recently democratized
country, politicians have no or low reputation and thus have no means of making credible
electoral promises to the citizenry (Rothstien 2015). Politicians must therefore rely on lo-
cal patronage networks and provide targeted goods to their supporters in a direct exchange
for votes (Rothstein 2015). Consequently, a young democracy will generally overprovide
targeted goods such as public sector jobs, public work projects and underprovide broad
public services that are designed to improve general welfare such as universal health-
care and education. The construction of political patron-clientelist networks around the
distribution of jobs and resources has been associated with greater deficit spending, pub-
55
lic sector inefficiency, resistance to market-oriented reforms, macroeconomic instability,
state predation and reduced growth (Remmer 2007).
I suggest that when the poor are ethnically heterogeneous, they are less likely to
politically organize and electorally pressure local leaders to provide public goods and
services that improve the general welfare of the poor. This is because when the poor
become more heterogeneous, they are less likely to identify themselves and value the
welfare of their class group. As a consequence, the poor are more likely to identify and
divide themselves along ethnic groups and electorally pressure local leaders to provide
patronage goods and private transfers instead of public goods and services that would im-
prove general welfare. Local leaders, in turn, are motivated to enough provide patronage
goods to form a winning coalition of ethnic groups that exclude other members of the
poor which results in public resources being distributed inefficiently. When the poor are
ethnically homogenous, they are more likely to identify within their class group and there-
fore vote for local leaders that will provide public goods and services that improve their
general welfare and thus local leaders will provide those good and services; and poverty
outcomes will improve.
This paper advances the knowledge on political institutions and development sev-
eral significant ways. First, the paper adds to the growing literature on the social identity
on cooperation and voting behaviour in democracies (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Luttmer
2001; Shayo 2009). Shayo (2009) provides a model and empirical results that partly
examined the effects of ethnic heterogeneity on class identity among the poor and redis-
tribution in advanced democracies. As Shayo (2009) admits himself, that the paper was
not a comprehensive study of the issue and further his model assume that there were only
two identities by which individuals adopt; national and class identity. This paper does
not use national identity and explicitly emphasizes how ethnic cleavages undermine class
solidarity, electoral accountability and poverty outcomes in Indonesia.
Second, it adds to the abundant literature on the negative effects of ethnic hetero-
geneity on collective action, public goods provision and other socio-economic outcomes
(Easterly and Levine 1997; Gerring et al. 2015). Although there some studies that exam-
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ined the effects of ethnic identity and other identities such as income or religion (Baldwin
and Huber 2010; Selway 2011), most studies focused on the general social heterogeneity
of a given society. Except for the Shayo (2009), this paper is the only one that explicitly
measures the level and effects of ethnic heterogeneity within various class groups.
By working rigorously within a country, the results of the paper are much less sus-
ceptible to the endogeneity issues common in cross-national study of institutions and
poverty. At the cross-national level, there are likely to be unobserved factors that are ex-
plaining variation of poverty. Indeed, it is likely that poverty affects the saliency of ethnic
heterogeneity and the quality of institutions. Therefore, it becomes difficult to isolate the
effect of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor on the effect of institutions on poverty. To ad-
dress these endogeneity issues and improve internal validity, Indonesia was chosen to be
the case study because the way the country transitioned to local democratic elections is
plausibly considered exogenous. The timing of the first district election was determined
by the end term of previous district leader, which in turn, was determined by a centralized
authoritarian regime. Because of this institutional ‘natural experiment’, it is plausible to
provide more accurate measurements of the effects of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor on
the effect of elections on public service delivery to the poor.
There are several studies on Indonesia’s recent transition to democratic elections
and its effects on socio-economic outcomes. Scholars previously examined the effects
of Indonesian local elections on political budget cycles (Pierskalla and Sacks 2014), lo-
cal government spending and service delivery Skoufias et al. (2014), local public goods
(Olken 2010), and local economic growth (Moricz and Sjoholm 2014). Alesina et al.
(2014) examines the effect of local ethnic heterogeneity on the level of deforestation and
political corruption in a district while Marvidis (2015) examine the effects on social capi-
tal. These studies tend to focus on the direct effect of elections or ethnic heterogeneity on
various socio-economic outcomes separately. This paper adds to the literature by intro-
ducing an intermediary variable; ethnic heterogeneity of the poor and provides a hypoth-
esis on the conditionally effects of ethnic heterogeneity on the effect of local elections on
poverty. This approach provides more nuance by showing that democratic elections are
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more likely to improve poverty outcomes under certain conditions, notably when the poor
are not ethnically heterogeneous.
This paper begins explaining the institutional and demographic background of In-
donesia and why it is an appropriate case study. The next section introduces the data and
the measurements of relevant variables such as ethnic heterogeneity, local elections and
poverty. Further sections provide analyses of the conditional effects of ethnic heterogene-
ity and local elections on public services for poverty alleviation. Lastly, the discussion and
conclusion summarizes the paper’s findings, short-comings, and implications for future
research.
Institutional Background of Indonesia
From 1965 to 1998 policies were formulated and implemented by a highly centralized
government and with limited political accountability during Suharto’s regime in Indone-
sia (Aspinall and Fealy 2003, and Pierskalla and Sacks 2014). Though provincial and
district governments existed and formal elections took place, all candidates were dictated
by the Ministry of Home Affairs. This left little room for local discretion or political
accountability. Moreover, local governments were highly dependent on earmarks and
intergovernmental transfers with limited own source of revenues (Malley, 2003).
Due to the Asian financial crisis, the fall of Suharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998
initiated a process of democratization and decentralization (Alesina et al, 2016).A mas-
sive wave of student and other demonstrations began in February 1998 remaking the
political landscape and confronting regime leaders (Aspinall 2013). Political tensions
within the elites and the broader public, had been escalating in Indonesia for more than
a decade (Aspinall and Fealy 2010). In May 1998, Suharto resigned and the new regime
leader President Habibe announced far-reaching forms to appease popular protests such
as liberalization of the press, repeal of repressive political laws and democratic elections.
Particularly, Law 22/1999 and Law 25/1999 outlined the main points of decentralization
reform: relocation of main government responsibilities to the district level (as opposed
to provinces and governors) and a system of revenue-sharing and regional redistribution
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(World Bank 2003). In 1999, citizens elected representatives to national, provincial and
district parliaments. Starting in 2001, local legislatures had the right to authorize the
budget and vote on local laws and regulations (Pierskalla and Sacks, 2014). The newly
empowered legislatures had greater control over selecting new local leaders (replacing
leaders whose five-year terms were coming to an end), more open lists, and more limited
edits by the Ministry of Home Affairs (Decree No. 22/1999).
The political powers of the local parliaments to greatly influence local leaders raised
several issues. First, there was a sense that local parliaments were overreaching their pow-
ers. That is, they were blurring the effective balance of governance between executive
and legislative agencies. Among the central and sub-national executive and civil service,
there was a growing recognition of the need to re-balance this relationship (Buehler 2010).
Second, there were accusations of money politics within district polities. Particularly, it
was claimed that district leaders bought their positions from the local parliaments. The
widespread corruption was one of the main reasons why the direct election of district
leaders was introduced in 2005 (Buehler 2010; Pierskella and Sacks 2014). The concerns
about indirect political accountability triggered the second wave of local government elec-
toral reform toward direct elections (Pilkada Langsung) under Law No. 32/2004 (Erb and
Sulistiyanto 2009). This reform made local leaders accountable to the people by requiring
them to be directly elected by citizens and provided a clear definition of the function of lo-
cal leaders. The law stipulated that a local leader should: 1) administer the jurisdiction as
per the guidelines laid down by the local parliament, 2) implement local laws, including
budget, 3) present accountability reports to the local parliament and central government,
and 4) provide information to citizens on the government’s performance (Skoufias et al,
2014).
It is important to note that the indirect (1999-2004) and direct (2005-onwards) elec-
tions of district leaders were not phased-in uniformly. To smooth the process of decen-
tralization and democratization local district leaders appointed by the Suharto’s regime
before 1999 could finish their terms and were replaced only consecutively between 1999
and 2004 (Pierskalla and Sacks 2014). The replacement of an appointed district leader
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took place at the end of the original term or after removals from office due to health rea-
sons or no-confidence votes (Pierskalla and Sacks 2014). The basic argument that the
timing of district leader elections is exogenous and unrelated to district characteristics
rests on the notion that the timing of appointment under the Suharto dictatorship followed
an unrelated logic (Pierskalla and Sacks 2014). Since the collapse of the regime occurred
suddenly in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, it is unlikely that appointments at the
district level were made in the anticipation of future competitive elections. In addition,
the exogenously determined schedule of district leader replacements was kept for direct
elections between 2005 and 2010. Thus, the timing of direct elections were unlikely to be
due district characteristics such poverty or ethnic heterogeneity. Further, Skoufias et al.
(2014) provide evidence on the similarity of districts with and without direct elections on
observable characteristics.
Though Indonesia’s transition to democracy is still quite young and the country
is relatively poor, elections are seen to be generally competitive and free (World Bank
2009). Indonesia had 4 presidents in the decade since the crisis and the fall of the New
Order regime and all have governed with multi-party coalitions (World Bank 2009). At
the district level, new political parties did emerge and were able to compete. The 7-point
Legislative and Executive Indices of Electoral Competition from the Database of Political
Institutions (Keefer 2007) consider countries most electorally competitive if they have had
multiple parties compete in elections and no party receives more than 75 percent of the
vote (Risa 2009). In both 1999 and 2004 elections in Indonesia, multiple parties competed
and the winning party took in less than 35 percent of the vote (Risa 2009). Issues related
to the performance of elected officials, especially regarding governance and corruption,
generally rate high among the express concern of voters and in the rhetoric of political
campaigns (World Bank 2009). Further, 40 percent of incumbent governors and distrct
leaders have been voted out of office in 2006 (World Bank 2009).
Previous research on the effects of democratic decentralization on public goods and
services and poverty outcomes produced mixed to insignificant results. Skoufias et al.
(2014) found that direct elections had no affect on human development outcomes such as
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primary school enrollment, percentage of births attended by skilled staff, percentage of
population with access to clean water electricity or safe sanitation. Kis-Katos and Sjahir
(2017) found that direct elections had no consistent effect on local public investments.
These studies examine the unconditional average effects of direct elections on poverty
outcomes. There are, however, qualtitiative studies that show numerous cases throughout
Indonesia, where candidates for political office at the local have responded to electoral in-
centives and competed with one another to offer increasingly elaborate and geneous social
programs (Aspinall 2013). Those political candidates have campaigned on free and im-
proved healthcare and education. There is much variation in terms of actual policy output
from those candiates. There is a case to be made that perhaps the effect of direct elections
is conditioned on the group characteristics and collective action capabilities of the poor
and that certain group characteristics could be conducive to direct elections signficantly
affecting and improving poverty outcomes.
Ethnic Heterogeneity and Social Identity Theory
Scholars have noted that promoting a shared social identity is essential for citizen cooper-
ation and political accountability (Singh 2015). Extensive work in social identity theory
demonstrate that people automatically categorize everybody in their social environment
into ingroups and outgroups (Transue 2007). Further, individuals align their sense of self
and utility to the social group with whom they most identify with. In addition, individ-
uals derive positive utility from enhancing the welfare of their ingroup and derive little
to negative utility from improving the welfare of outgroups’ utility. There are numerous
identities from which individuals could adopt such as class, gender, ethnicity, religion,
et cetera and often the personal adoption is determined by the social and political envi-
ronment (Transue 2007). In terms of democratic accountability and provision of broad
public goods and services, the formation of a common class identity among the poor
was essential for the provision of high quantity and quality public goods and services in
Scandinavian democracies (Alesina and Glaeser 2004). As the poor become politically
organized, they maintained the electoral pressure for left-wing political parties to provide
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broad public goods and services and high levels of redistribution.
Empirical studies on democratization in ethnically heterogenous societies, however,
support the hypothesis that ethnic cleavages undermine class solidarity and the provision
of broad public goods and services and instead furthered patron-clientelist relationships
and corrupt political behaviour (Wantchekon 2003). For example, Van de Walle (2003)
found that clientelism along ethnic cleavages significantly undermined democratic perfor-
mance in Sub-Saharan Africa; a region known to be highly ethnically diverse. Because
of pervasive ethnic patronage and clientelism, there was low salience of social class iden-
tities despite large social inequalities, a deficiency of programmatic political parties, and
the quality of social services for the poor across Sub-Saharan countries (Van de Walle
2003). Other empirical studies support Van de Walle’s findings and show that ethnic het-
erogeneity is indeed associated with higher levels of patronage goods, private transfers
and corruption (La Porta et al. 1999; Glaeser and Sacks 2006; Treisman 2007), un-
dermines the provision and quality of public goods (Easterly and Levine 1997; Alesina
and La Ferrara 2000; Gerring et al. 2015) and social capital especially among the poor
(Alesina and La Ferra 2000; Costa and Kahn 2003; Putnam 2007). Chandra (1999) notes
ethnic divisions undermines the provision of broad public goods and services such as land
reform that are essential for promoting the general welfare of the poor in India.
Indonesia is a suitable case study because it is a highly ethnically heterogeneous
country with more than 300 ethnic groups and 742 distinct languages (Alesina et al.
2014). Most groups are native to the country and their presence on the islands predates
written history. Strong regional identities continue to be prevalent, and these are partly
responsible for recent sub-heterogeneity and splitting of provinces and districts (Alesina
et al .2014). Ethnic heterogeneity also play an important role in community decisions
and local politics. Alesina et al. (2014) show that higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity
are associated with higher levels of deforestation and corruption. They argue that ethnic
heterogeneity negatively affect the likelihood that villagers will collectively act against
logging companies and curb corruption. Okten and Osili (2004) found that ethnic het-
erogeneity and heterogeneity of preferences within communities negatively affects the
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contribution and prevalence of community organizations in Indonesia. Mavridis (2015)
found that voting in elections increases with the share of own ethnicity and decreases with
ethnic diversity.
In addition, a substantial portion of the electorate in Indonesia are considered poor.
Nearly half of Indonesia’s population in 2007 could reasonably be considered amongst
the ”near poor” or poor because their per-capita consumption levels were less than a third
above the national povery line (World Bank 2009; p. 7). This is important because the
theory assumes that if the poor organize based on class interests, they are more likely to
electorally pressure political elites to provide services that improve their general welfare.
This, however, leaves out the relevancy of middle and rich classes. That is, if the mid-
dle and rich form a coalition and comprise a majority, they can effectively organize and
pressure political elites to favour them despite the poor collectively acting in their class
interests. Since a large portion of Indonesians are considered poor, their numerical weight
could heavily influence political elites if they organize effectively.
Case studies at the local level provide a pertinent example of how democratization
and ethnic homogeneity affected the political organization of citizens and government
policy. Sekar Kamulya, a village located southeast of Bandung provides a pertinent ex-
ample. The village is known to have the capacities for successful collective action; a
relatively small population and ethnically homogenous (Beard and Dasgupta, 2006). De-
spite the ethnic and religious homogeneity, there are notable socio-economic disparities.
Historically, a group of ‘old elite’ from a single extended family dominated community
governance in the village (Beard and Dasgupta, 2006). The members of the elite groups
appointed positions to non-elites whom were willing to favor the elite interests at the ex-
pense of the village. The elites conducted client- patronage politics by giving out material
rewards generated from community development projects such as infrastructure (Beard
and Dasgupta, 2006).
Since democratization and decentralization, power over community governance be-
gan to redistribute. The establishment of new community governance institutions has cre-
ated opportunities for political competition that has brought new political actors in power.
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The introduction of broad-participation policies departed from previous community meet-
ings which only included elites in the past, to include everyone in the community. Beard
and Dasgupta (2006; p.242) note that, “For the first time, local residents participated in
a democratic process to selected project leaders, rather than candidates being nominated
by the existing leaders of neighbourhood organizations and wards.”. Beard and Dasgupta
(2006) suggest that dispute the religious subdivisions of Islam and social values in the
Sekar Kamulyn, the non-elites were able to cooperate and steer their local planning and
process and distribute resources more in their favor. These previous studies suggest that
Indonesia is an appropriate case study for the issues under investigation in the present
paper.
Data
Dependent Variables
This paper will focus on absolute measures of poverty (World Bank, 2013). That is,
a condition characterized by severe deprivation of basic human needs, including food,
safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education and information (UN
1995). Unfortunately, infant and child mortality rates, which are good measures of ab-
solute poverty, are not measured at the district level in Indonesia. Instead, the paper will
use various measures of basic services that are known to reduce the probability of infant
and child mortality rates. I chose the percentage of households with access to safe sani-
tation, safe water, and births attended by skilled staff (Ross 2006). These services were
also selected because the timespan of the treatment effect (2005 to 2010) was a maximum
of 5 years. For that reason, it was important to choose public services that can be im-
plemented relatively quickly. The data on these variables came from the annual national
socio-economic surveys of households in Indonesia (SUSENAS) which are representa-
tive at the district level since 2000 and were compiled in the World Bank Jakarta team’s
database (IDPER 2014).
In addition, the national poverty line is included to provide further information on
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the general welfare of the poor. The national poverty line is defined in terms of the con-
sumption expenditures that are required to fulfil basic food and non-food needs (JBIC,
2001). The food component is defined as the total expenditure required providing 2,100
calories of energy per day (JBIC, 2001). The non-food component is defined as the es-
sential expenditure on non-food items, which includes 25 to 27 commodities such as
clothing, housing, education, housing, education, health and transportation (JBIC, 2001).
The BPS revises the poverty line when new consumption figures are collected from the
annual national socio-economic surveys of households (SUSENSAS). The data on these
variables came from the annual national socio-economic surveys of house- holds in In-
donesia (SUSENAS) which are representative at the district level since 2000 and were
compiled in the World Bank Jakarta team’s database (IDPER, 2015). Poverty is log trans-
formed to make interpretation easier as it is highly right skewed and for the possibility of
a non-linear relationship. Democratic elections may have a greater effect on the number
of people who considered poor at high levels compared to low levels.
Independent Variables
There are two measures included for ethnic heterogeneity of the poor. The first is the well-
known ethnic fractionalization (EF). It broadly measures the probability that two random
individuals will belong to two different ethnic groups. The variable is constructed using
the Herfindahl index :
EF = 1−
G∑
i=1
s2ij (3.1)
The variable subtracts the sum square of the share of ethnic groups over the total
population within a district. Where sij is the share of ethnic group i over the total popula-
tion of the district j and G is the number of ethnic groups. For any number of groups, the
measure increases as groups become more equal in size. If all groups are of equal size,
then the society with a larger number of groups possesses a higher index of diversity. The
measurement is continuous from 0 to 1. A value of 0 means that there is complete ethnic
homogeneity in a given society while a value of 1 means that there is complete diversity.
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EF was measured at the district level using the 2010 Indonesian Census (10 percent of the
population).
Figure 1 below shows the level of ethnic fractionalization across the districts in
Indonesia. Darker blue shades indicate higher levels of ethnic fractionalization while
lighter shades indicate lower levels. The data of the map came from the 2010 Indonesian
census.
Figure 3.1: Ethnic Heterogeneity in Indonesia
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EF, however, does not sufficiently measure the variable of interest. The measure
accounts for the aggregate diversity of a given society but it does not account for class
cleavages. This is a serious disadvantage because the theory argues that higher ethnic het-
erogeneity of the poor reduces that positive effect of direct elections on pro-poor services
rather than ethnic heterogeneity in general. For this reason, an ethno-wealth fractional-
ization indices (EWF) were constructed :
EWFk = 1−
G∑
i=1
s2ij (3.2)
Similar to EF , the measure subtracts the sum square of the share of ethnic groups
over a population within a district i from 1. The major difference, however, is that the
EWFk measure subtracts from a class population rather than the total population within
a district. In this case, sij is the share of ethnic group i over a class population k (e.g.
the poor) of the district j and G is the number of ethnic groups. As a result, EWFk is a
variable that measures ethnic fractionalization of class groups rather than ethnic fraction-
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alization of a given society. The measure is constructed using the same Indonesian 2010
census. A challenge for the construction of this variable is that the census lacks adequate
information on income or consumption expenditures. Often, many people do not know
their income or only know it in broad ranges. Moreover, most people try to hide their
income from interviewers, especially if the interviewers are from a government agency
(Otsby 2008).
To solve this problem, I use instead the information collected on other household
characteristics. The wealth index is calculated on the basis of whether or not each house-
hold has ownership of electricity, water supply, the dwelling, piped water, sewage, gas
fuel, kerosene fuel, wood fuel, cell phone, phone, flush toilet, non-flush toilet , cement
floor, ceramic floor, and tile floor. These household characteristics were used to proxy
wealth through principal component analysis (PCA). PCA is a statistical technique that
describes the variation of a set of multivariate data in terms of a set of uncorrelated linear
combinations of the original variables (Vyas and Kumaranayake 2006). Each consecutive
linear combination is derived to explain as much of the variation in the original data as
possible, while being uncorrelated with other linear combinations. The asset index is the
first principal component or the first linear combination. The asset index was split into
quantiles ranging from the poorest 20 percent; Q1 to the richest 20 percent; Q5. Then I
use the Herfindahl index to measure ethnic fractionalization for each quantile. EWFQ1
represents ethnic fractionalization of the poorest 20 percent whileEWFQ5 represents the
richest 20 percent. Since the theory argues that ethnic heterogeneity of the poor should
reduce the likelihood that direct elections will positively affect public service delivery,
only the first two quantiles (EWFQ1 and EWFQ2) were used because they represent
ethnic heterogeneity of the poorest members within the districts.
I focus on one dimension of political institutions: the direct elections of district
leaders. The variable ElectedLeader is measured by the year that the district held its
first direct election of the local leader. It is a dichotomous variable; 1 indicating first
direct election and 0, otherwise. This was compiled by the Jakarta World Bank team
with the collaboration of the Ministry of Home Affairs and a number of local institutions,
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including NDI Indonesia, and the Asia Foundation (Skoufias et al. 2014).
I also included two additional control variables; log of income and log of popula-
tion density. The clear majority of empirical studies show that income affects poverty
outcomes (Ross 2006). Population density is included to account for the possibility that
local governments have a more difficult time providiing public services to the poor in
sparsely populated areas. (Ross 2006). Both variables are log transformed because the
effect of both variables on poverty might be be non-linear, to make interpretation easier
as the distribution is right skewed and all the values are positive. Province fixed accounts
were also included to account for possible unobserved heterogeneity at the provincial
level. Data on income, population density and provinces are provided by Pierskalla and
Sacks (2014) whom used World Bank data.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
I analyze two models. It would be useful to see the average effects of local elections on
poverty outcomes first. For that reason, the first model examines the average effects of
local elections on poverty with a random effects panel model for Indonesian districts from
2001-2010. Specifically, I estimate with the following model:1:
yit = a+ zt + ui +B1Electionsit +B2Controlsit + eit (3.3)
I model poverty yit in district i and year t as a function of the independent variables
Electionsit as well as the constant a, year effects zt, province fixed effects ui, Controlsit
and the error term eit. B1 provides information of the average marginal effects of direct
elections on public service delivery and poverty outcomes. Identification of the marginal
effect is plausible. The timing of direct elections is exogenous to local characteristics
such as poverty because it followed a pre-determined exogenous schedule (Pierskella and
Sacks 2014). Skoufias et al. (2014) analysed the effects of various local characteristics
(e.g. GDP per capita, unemployment rate) on the probability of a district having elections
1The summary statistics of all the variables are in the appendix labelled Table 3
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between 2005 and 2007 using a probit model. They found that the variable indicating
whether the last government served full term before the direct election predicted strongly
whether a direct election was carried out from the probit model while all other district
level characteristics are insignificant.
In the second model, I analyse the conditional effects of ethnic heterogeneity of the
poor on the conditional effects of local elections on public service delivery and poverty
outcomes with a random effects panel model for Indonesian districts from 2001-2010.
Specifically, I estimate with the following model:
yit = a+zt+ui+B1Electionsit+B2EFit+B3(Electionsit∗EFit)+B4Controlsit+eit
(3.4)
In the interaction model, poverty yit in district i and year t is modeled as a function
of independent variables Electionsit and EFit as well as the constant a, year effects zt,
province fixed effects ui and Controlsit, and the error term eit. B3 provides information
on the conditional effects of local elections on poverty when there is a one unit increase
in ethnic heterogeneity and vice versa. The coefficient B1 provides information on the
conditional effect of local elections when ethnic heterogeneity is equal to 0. From these
coefficients, I can test the hypothesis that at higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity of the
poor, local elections negatively affect poverty outcomes. There are two variants of this
model. The first will use the standard ethnic fractionalization variable to measure ethnic
heterogeneity of the poor and the second will use the ethnic heterogeneity of the two
poorest quantiles. Both models control for log of population density and income.
3.3 Results
Table 3.1 shows that local elections have mixed effects on various public goods and
poverty outcomes. The results on the level of significance is also mixed. In columns
1 and 2, local elections are associated with 1.16 and 1 percentage increase in household
access to safe sanitation and safe water. They are statistically significant at the 99 and 95
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Table 3.1: Local Elections and Poverty
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Safe Sanitation Safe Water Birth Log Poverty
Elections 1.16∗∗ 1.15∗ 0.49 0.0053
(0.39) (0.47) (0.60) (0.0055)
Constant 39.21∗∗ 27.83∗∗ 44.44∗∗ 4.85∗∗
(3.21) (2.98) (2.96) (0.06)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,545 3,544 3,523 3,315
R2 0.30 0.45 0.53 0.49
Standard errors at the district level are in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
Controls include ethnic heterogeneity, log of income and population density.
percent confidence levels respectively. In column 3, local elections are associated with
0.49 percentage increase in births attended by skilled staff. In column 4, local elections
increase poverty. Neither relationships are statistically significant. To test the hypothesis
of this study, regressions of the conditional effects of ethnic heterogeneity on the effect
on local elections on poverty are produced.
Table 3.2 shows that at higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity, local elections are as-
sociated with worse provision of public goods and poverty outcomes for the majority of
the dependent variables. In columns 1 and 3, local elections are associated with 2.61 and
2.64 percent increase in household access to safe sanitation and births attended by skilled
staff when ethnic heterogeneity is equal to 0. The negative coefficients of the interaction
term Elections ∗ EF indicate that the positive effect attenuates as ethnic heterogeneity
increases. Those coefficients are statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence lev-
els. In column 4, local elections decrease poverty when ethnic heterogeneity is equal to
0. This coefficient is not statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. The
coefficient of the interaction term Elections ∗ EF indicate that the negative effect atten-
uates as ethnic heterogeneity increases and is statistically significant. In column 2, the
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Table 3.2: Local Elections, Ethnic Heterogeneity and Poverty
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Safe Sanitation Safe Water Birth Log Poverty
Elections 2.61∗∗ 0.70 2.64∗∗ −0.012
(0.47) (0.58) (0.74) (0.0068)
EF 12.8∗∗ 9.19∗∗ 10.4∗∗ −0.070
(3.00) (2.51) (2.63) (0.067)
Elections*EF −3.56∗∗ 1.11 −5.22∗∗ 0.044∗∗
(0.67) (0.83) (1.04) (0.0099)
Constant 19.4∗∗ −0.95 20.3∗∗ 5.02∗∗
(3.44) (2.98) (3.14) (0.071)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,545 3,544 3,523 3,354
R2 0.42 0.60 0.60 0.52
Standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
Controls include log of income and population density.
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effect of local elections on the percentage of household access to safe water when eth-
nic heterogeneity is 0 is positive and not statistically significant. The interaction term is
not statistically significant either. To test the hypothesis and examine the effects of local
elections on poverty at varying levels of ethnic heterogeneity, marginal effect graphs are
produced.
Figure 3.2: Local Elections, Ethnic Heterogeneity and Poverty
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Figure 3.2 shows results that generally confirm the hypothesis that at higher lev-
els of ethnic heterogeneity, local elections are associated with worse poverty outcomes.
At low levels of ethnic heterogeneity, local elections are positively associated household
access to safe sanitation and births attended by skilled staff. At the highest levels of eth-
nic heterogeneity, local elections decrease household access to safe sanitation and births
attended by skilled staff. The conditional effects of elections on safe sanitation is statis-
tically significant a the 95 percent confidence levels from when ethnic heterogeneity is
equal to 0 to around 0.5 and then loses statistical significance. The conditional effects of
elections on births attended by skilled staff is statistically significant from when ethnic
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heterogeneity is equal to 0 to around 0.2 and from around 0.7 to 1 and loses statistical
significance in between. At low levels of ethnic heterogeneity, local elections are reduces
the number of people below the poverty line while at high levels of ethnic heterogeneity,
local elections are associated with higher number of people below the poverty line. The
conditional effects of elections are statistically significant when ethnic heterogeneity is
equal to 0.5 to 1 and loses significance at other levels. Contrary to the hypothesis, lo-
cal elections increases access to safe water when the poor are ethnically heterogeneous
compared to being homogeneous.
Table 3.3: Local Elections, Ethnic Heterogeneity of the Poorest Quantile and Poverty
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Safe Sanitation Safe Water Birth Log Poverty
Elections 2.21∗∗ 0.83 2.63∗∗ −0.011
(0.49) (0.60) (0.80) (0.0070)
EWFQ1 13.4∗∗ 6.84∗∗ 10.4∗∗ 0.88
(3.44) (2.85) (2.91) (0.079)
Elections*EWFQ1 −3.24∗∗ 0.97 −5.60∗∗ 0.048∗∗
(0.74) (0.92) (1.21) (0.011)
Constant 23.3∗∗ −2.99 19.4∗∗ 4.72∗∗
(4.21) (3.52) (3.59) (0.091)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,836 2,835 2,823 2,624
R2 0.43 0.61 0.62 0.56
Standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
Controls include log of income and population density.
Table 3.3 shows that at higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity of the poorest quantile,
local elections are associated with worse provision of public goods and poverty outcomes
for the majority of the dependent variables. In columns 1 and 3, local elections are asso-
ciated with 2.21 and 2.63 percentage increase in household access to safe sanitation and
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births attended by skilled staff when EWFQ1 is equal to 0. The negative coefficients of
the interaction term Elections ∗ EWFQ1 indicate that the positive effect attenuates as
ethnic heterogeneity of the poor increases. Those coefficients are statistically significant
at the 99 percent confidence levels. In column 4, local elections decrease poverty when
ethnic heterogeneity is equal to 0. This coefficient is not statistically significant at the 95
percent confidence levels. The coefficient of the interaction Elections ∗ EWFQ1 indi-
cate that the negative effect attenuates as ethnic heterogeneity of the poor increases and is
statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level. In column 2, the effect of local
elections on the percentage of household access to safe water when ethnic heterogeneity
is 0 is positive and not statistically significant. The interaction term is not statistically sig-
nificant either. To get a better understanding of the relationships, graphs of the marginal
effects are produced.
Figure 3.3: Local Elections, Ethnic Heterogeneity of the Poorest Quantile and Poverty
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Figure 3.3 shows results that generally confirm the hypothesis that at higher levels
of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor, local elections are associated with worse public goods
and poverty outcomes. At low levels of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor, local elections
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increase household access to safe sanitation and births attended by skilled staff. While
at the highest levels of ethnic heterogeneity, local elections decrease household access
to safe sanitation and births attended by skilled staff. The conditional effects of local
elections on safe sanitation is statistically significant a the 95 percent confidence levels
from whenEWFQ1 is equal to 0 to around 0.4 and then loses statistical significance. The
conditional effects of elections on births attended by skilled staff is statistically significant
from EWFQ1 is equal to 0 to around 0.2 and from around 0.8 to 0.9 and loses statistical
significance in between. At levels of EWFQ1 0 to 0.2, local elections are reduces the
number of people below the poverty line while at levels of EWFQ1 0.3 to 0.9, local
elections increase the number of people below the poverty line. The conditional effects
of elections are statistically significant when ethnic heterogeneity is equal to 0.5 to 1 and
loses significance at other levels. Contrary to the hypothesis, local elections are more
likely to increase percentage of households with safe water when the poor are ethnically
heterogeneous compared to being homogeneous.
For further analysis, regressions on the effect of direct elections conditioned by eth-
nic heterogeneity of the second poorest quantile were conducted. The results are similar
to the previous tables that include ethnic heterogeneity variables. That is, at higher lev-
els of ethnic heterogeneity of the second poorest quantile, local elections are associated
with worse access to safe sanitation, births attended by skilled staff and higher number of
people considered poor but has the opposite effect on access to safe water. The regression
table and marginal effects graphs are included in the Appendix.
3.3.1 Additional Controls: Migration
There is reason to suspect that the migration during democratization may have affected the
ethnic composition of Indonesian districts. Transmigration programs in Indonesia were
implemented for the aim of relocating landless people from highly populated areas such
as Java to less densely populated ones (Alesina et al., 2014). If ethnic composition has
changed over time due to transmigration programs, then the ethnic heterogeneity variables
are endogenous. The period of my analyses (2001-2010), however, suggest that migration
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maybe a less of an issue than previous periods. Though the government maintained their
transmigration programs after the 1998 financial crisis and the fall of Suharto regime, the
scale of transmigration has decreased notably (Arifin and Ananta, 2013). Further, there
is evidence that internal migration in Indonesia decreased from 2000 to 2010 compared
to previous decades (Arifin and Ananta, 2013). However, to account for the possible
endogeneity issues of migration and ethnic composition, the dummy ”Javanese” is aimed
at controlling the presence of the relevant transitory ethnic group in a district. I also
control for log of population and population growth at the district level; similar to Alesina
et al.’s approach (2014).
3.4 Discussion
The results suggest that local elections are less likely to improve the welfare of the poor in
districts with high ethnic heterogeneity of the poor compared to ones with low ethnic het-
erogeneity. The results, however, are not entirely consistent. Ethnic heterogeneity of the
poor negatively affects the effect of direct elections on household access to safe sanitation
and maternal care but not safe water. Although the reasons are not entirely certain, there
are some factors that may elucidate this issue. First, it is important to understand why
there are contradicting results with safe sanitation and water since both services are likely
to overlap and require similar policies and infrastructure set up. One explanation is that
villagers seem to have greater influence over local government policy on sanitation than
safe water. In 2002, a major national sanitation program called Sanitation by Communi-
ties (SANIMAS) was implemented and expanded to more than 100 cities and regencies
in 22 provinces (ADB 2012). Asian Development Bank described it as a “demand-driven
approach whereby residents who wish to improve sanitation services in a particular area
are encouraged to participate in the implementation of new facilities” and “the approach
was an option for a quick response to providing sanitation services for low-income com-
munities. . . ” (ABD 2012). Local governments contribute to funding while the villagers
pick from a variety of public services such as communal septic tanks, bathing, washing,
toilet facilities, and small communal waste water treatment and provide the necessary
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labour. In this context, it makes sense that higher ethnic heterogeneity reduces the likeli-
hood that villagers will collectively act and pressure their local government to provide safe
sanitation because villagers had the capacity to influence government behaviour within a
relatively short period.
Unlike sanitation, however, there is no specific policy that grants villagers signif-
icant influence over how local governments implement safe water. For one thing, it is
not clear how much influence local governments have over the water supply. Although
the issuance of Law 7 in 2004 and Government Regulation No. 16 in 2005 emphasized
the heterogeneity of roles and responsibilities between the central and local governments
in water supply provision, the relationship between which entities supply water services
remain complex. Local governments are both the owners of PDAMS (local government
owned water utilities) and the regulators of tariffs in local areas, however, the central
government still invests more than local governments in their local water supply infras-
tructure. Further, local government have historically viewed the PDAMS as independent
entities sourcing their own development financing. Local governments may operate small
water supply facilities in areas that are not controlled by the PDAM, and if they provide
funding for the PDAM, they use their own budget funds, usually through their city Public
Works Department which designs and procures infrastructure, often without prior consul-
tation with the PDAM that ultimately must maintain and operate it. The local government
budget does not accommodate multi-year projects and many local governments are still
reluctant to spend their funds on water project.
Another explanation is that the norms of villagers self-supplying their water remain
pervasive and were unlikely to be changed much within the years that direct elections
occurred (2005-2010). According to the National Social Economy Survey (SUSENAS)
in July 2009, only 15 percent of the respondents said they receive their water from mu-
nicipal and other piped water while the majority say they received their water from rivers,
streams, lakes, ground water from wells, and bottled water. This is largely due to the
lack of state capacity to provide piped water but it may also be due to the slow change
of norms. Indeed, as the World Bank noted, “even in the areas where utilities are able
77
to provide drinking quality water at the tap, the customers are still in the habit of boiling
water prior to consumption” (2015). So even if local governments had the state capacity
to provide safe water, perhaps many villagers were unlikely to pressure the government
because they were already used to supplying their own water. For these reasons, ethnic
heterogeneity had no effect on direct elections and household access to safe water.
Another concern is that the influence of norms may bias the effect of ethnic het-
erogeneity of the poor on direct elections and maternal care because it may be the case
that a significant number of mothers prefer to give birth at home rather than at a clinic
or hospital attended by skilled staff (Titaley et al., 2010). This implies that the mother’s
preferences of maternal care explains the effect rather than ethnic heterogeneity of the
poor. There is evidence, however, that attitudes toward professional maternal care shifted
significantly among Indonesian women. According to the 2012 Indonesian Demographic
and Health Surveys (IDHS), about 37 percent of births in the five years preceding the
survey occurred “outside a medical facility, almost all of these being within the woman’s
own home” (National Research Council 2013). This represents a significant improvement
over the 2002 IDHS when closer to 60 percent of births were recoded as taking place out-
side a medical facility. It is important to note, however, that the term “medical facilities”
includes not just organized hospitals or clinics but also places such as the home of a nurse
or qualified midwife (National Research Council 2013).
3.5 Conclusion
This paper provided some evidence that ethnic heterogeneity of the poor and its effects on
collective action partially explain why democratic elections does not necessarily help the
poor. Taking advantage of the unique exogenous variation of political institutions at the
local level and the high quality data in Indonesia, it was plausible to measure the causal
effects of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor on direct elections and public service delivery
to the poor. Although the results were not entirely consistent, background history on how
the services were implemented by the local government provided some explanation for
the differences.
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The results also suggest that focusing on the relationship between formal politi-
cal institutions on poverty, alone, is not sufficient. Although previous formal models on
democratic elections make a logical case that enfranchising the poor should lead to higher
levels of redistribution and public goods, the predictions, often, failed to occur across a
number of developing countries. One plausible reason is that the models groundlessly
assume the poor will collectively act and pressure governments to raise the revenue and
provide the services that improve their welfare. Such an approach, however, neglects the
importance the effects of group identity on collective action that is conducive to poverty
alleviation. Indeed, previous efforts by researchers have found no effect of direct elections
on poverty outcomes in Indonesia (Skoufias et al. 2014). And yet, when direct elections is
treated as conditional effect; included as a part of an interaction term with various ethnic
heterogeneity variables, direct election elections substantively and significantly affects
poverty and public service delivery to the poor at some levels of ethnic heterogeneity.
This study, in addition to many previous ones, suggest that ethnic heterogeneity
affect the norms and culture that are necessary for collective action. Although the pa-
per cannot claim to identify the exact causal mechanism, the results suggest that ethnic
heterogeneity hinders collective action of the poor. Further, the results suggest that demo-
cratic elections are more likely to improve the welfare of the poor if this group organises
on economic grounds. If ethnic heterogeneity among the poor hinder effective organ-
isation, then an important policy implication could be the need to promote a common
identity among the poor. Some governments such as those in Tanzania implemented poli-
cies to promote national and socio-economic identities with reasonably successful results
(Miguel 2004). Further research on how language and education policies that promote a
common identity are fruitful areas to understand how to mitigate the negative effects of
ethnic heterogeneity on poverty and create more effective institutions.
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3.6 Appendix
Table 3.4: Summary Statistics
Variables N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Safe Sanitation 3,571 59.266 17.760 0.61 96.55
Safe Water 3,570 47.688 19.792 0.15 99.110
Birth 3,549 70.084 20.774 1.54 100.000
Elected Leader 3,809 0.458 0.498 0 1
ELF 3,881 0.4182 0.318 0.007 0.997
EWFQ1 3,186 0.350 0.317 0.000 0.948
EWFQ2 3,198 0.368 0.314 0.001 0.945
EWFQ3 3,198 0.384 0.315 0.002 0.943
EWFQ4 3,170 0.431 0.313 0.010 0.938
EWFQ5 2,491 0.428 0.308 0.015 0.916
Table 3.5: Local Elections, Ethnic Heterogeneity of the Second Poorest Quantile and
Poverty
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Safe Sanitation Safe Water Birth Poverty
Elections 2.56∗∗ 1.05∗ 3.07∗∗ −0.016∗
(0.49) (0.61) (0.80) (0.0070)
EWFQ2 13.1∗∗ 6.96∗ 10.5∗∗ 0.030
(3.66) (3.06) (3.09) (0.085)
Elections*EWFQ2 −4.08∗∗ 0.58 −6.63∗∗ 0.063∗∗
(0.74) (0.92) (1.21) (0.011)
Constant 23.2∗∗ −1.91 19.1∗∗ 4.74∗∗
(4.18) (3.53) (3.57) (0.092)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,855 2,854 2,840 2,624
R2 0.43 0.61 0.62 0.55
Standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
Controls include log of income and population density.
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Table 3.6: Ethnic Heterogeneity of the Poorest Quantile with Additional Controls
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Safe Sanitation Safe Water Birth Poverty
Elections 2.01∗∗ 0.70 1.94∗∗ −0.0050
(0.49) (0.61) (0.58) (0.0069)
EWFQ1 7.83∗∗ 6.30∗ 6.08∗∗ −0.11∗∗
(3.38) (2.97) (3.01) (0.037)
Elections*EWFQ1 −2.95∗∗ 1.04 −5.38∗∗ 0.032∗∗
(0.77) (0.95) (0.91) (0.011)
Constant 22.2∗∗ −8.66 44.6∗∗ 0.17
(11.3) (10.2) (10.3) (0.012)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,558 2,558 2,544 2,582
R2 0.49 0.61 0.67 0.80
Standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
Controls include log of income and population density.
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Table 3.7: Ethnic Heterogeneity of the Second Poorest Quantile with Additional Controls
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Safe Sanitation Safe Water Birth Poverty
Elections 2.33∗∗ 0.89 2.39∗∗ −0.011
(0.50) (0.62) (0.59) (0.0070)
EWFQ2 7.21∗ 6.21 5.93 −0.13∗∗
(3.58) (3.19) (3.19) (0.039)
Elections*EWFQ2 −3.72∗∗ 0.71 −6.43∗∗ 0.048∗∗
(0.77) (0.96) (0.91) (0.011)
Constant 21.0 −11.4 43.8∗∗ 0.18
(11.1) (10.2) (10.2) (0.12)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,576 2,576 2,560 2,600
R2 0.50 0.61 0.67 0.80
Standard errors in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
Controls include log of income and population density.
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Figure 3.4: Local Elections, Ethnic Heterogeneity of the Second Poorest Quantile and
Poverty
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Figure 3.5: Ethnic Heterogeneity of the Poorest Quantile with Additional Controls
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Figure 3.6: Ethnic Heterogeneity of the Second Poorest Quantile with Additional Controls
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Chapter 4
Oil Windfalls, Ethnic Heterogeneity and
Poverty in Brazil: An Instrumental
Variables Approach
4.1 Introduction
Does ethnic heterogeneity of the poor negatively affect the effect of oil revenue transfers
on poverty in Brazil? In a federal state, transfers from the central government to smaller
administrative units such as municipalities are important sources of revenue for the pro-
vision of public goods and services and services (Brollo et al. 2013). Previous studies
on the effects of intergovernmental transfers to local governments in developing countries
on poverty outcomes, however, remain inconclusive (Litschg 2012). In many develop-
ing countries, public programs are often stymied by the capture of local powerful elites,
that distort and divert public programs to benefit themselves at the expense of the poor
(Bardhan and Mookherjee 2005; Khemani and Keefer 2005 and Olken 2008). Since inter-
governmental transfers finance a large share of decentralized public service provision in
developing countries, it is important to understand the conditions under which additional
financing actually reaches the poor (Shah 2006).
Many scholars argue that institutions that promote political accountability are nec-
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essary to reduce rent-seeking from natural resource transfers (James et al. 2006; Mehlum
et al. 2006). With open competitive elections, the electorate have the institutional mech-
anisms to hold their government accountable. If the incumbent does not fund services
that improve the welfare of the poor, the poor can oust the incumbent for a more suitable
one by majority rule. Further, if the poor are well-informed about the political candidates
and their policy platforms, they are more likely to provide a credible threhsold for polit-
ical elites to meet and as a result, political elites are more likely to keep their promises
(Besley and Burgess 2002; Ferraz and Finan 2011).
It is plausible to argue, however, that formal institutions such as elections and trans-
parency laws still require the electorate to successfully organize. If the poor do not or-
ganize and electorally pressure their local political elites to allocate government revenue
such as those from taxing natural resources to fund public goods and services that improve
their general welfare, then it is unlikely that the poor citizens will establish the credible
threshold that is needed to produce political elites that favour the economc interests of the
poor. To establish such a credible threshold, the poor have to collectively act. Particularly,
I argue that the poor are more likely collectively act and improve their general welfare if
they strongly identify with their class group. Drawing from the social psychology liter-
ature, individuals tend to nest their own utility to that of the group with whom the most
identify with (Costa-Font and Cowell 2013). If the poor strongly identify with their class
group, then they are more likely to collectively act and pressure local elites to improve
the general welfare of their group. If the poor are ethnically heterogeneous, however, the
social distance between members of the poor will increase and thus they are less likely to
identify within their class group. Instead of class-based organization, they are more likely
to organize based on ethnic lines and elect political elites that provide patronage goods
that may favour their group but at the expense of other members of the poor; resulting in
an inefficient distribution of public resources.
This paper advances knowledge in several ways. First, I examine a specific type of
intergovernmental transfer: oil revenue in Brazil. Previous studies on oil revenue in Brazil
found that federal transfers of oil revenue are associated with higher educational spending
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(Litschig 2012), while others found oil revenue increased public spending but had little
or no effect on living standards (Caselli and Michaels 2013), and that oil revenue do not
necessarily lead to an incumbent advantage (Monteiro and Ferraz 2012). Bhavnani and
Lupu (2016) found that oil revenue is more likely to improve incumbent advantage when
institutions are weak. This paper adds to the literature by addressing poverty directly and
examining the conditions in which the poor are more likely to benefit from oil revenues
among Brazilian municipalities. That is, oil revenues are more likely to reduce poverty in
Brazilian municipalities where the poor are ethnically homogeneous than heterogeneous.
Second, by working rigorously within a country, this study is less susceptible to the endo-
geneity issues of resource royalty transfers and poverty at the cross-national level. There
are many possible factors such as institutions, culture and policy that could potentially
confound the relationship. In Brazil, however, it is plausible to argue that offshore oil
production is exogenous conditioned on geographic controls. By instrumenting oil rev-
enue transfers with oil output, this paper takes advantage of the exogenous variation that
comes from oil production and price shocks and allows me to examine the effect of the
exponential increase in oil royalty transfers on poverty at the municipal level.
Second, this paper contributes to the vast ethnic heterogeneity and poverty literature.
Most studies on this topic tend to focus on the effects of ethnic heterogeneity on poverty
via indirectly through public goods provision (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Gerring et al
.2015; Kuijs 2000), corruption (Glaeser and Saks 2006; La Porta et al. 1999) and growth
(Easterly and Levine 1997). There are few studies that examine the relationship between
ethnic heterogeneity and natural resources (Holder 2004). As far as I can tell, this is the
first paper that examines the effect of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor on the effect of
oil revenues on poverty outcomes. Although there are some multi-dimensional measures
of ethnity and other group identities (Alesina et al. 2016; Baldwin and Huber 2010;
Selway 2011), the paper adds to the literature by creating measures of ethnic heterogeneity
within class groups among Brazilian municipalities. Finally, this paper contributes to
the growing literature on informal institutions, political economy and development. A
growing body of literature has shown that informal institutions matters for a variety of
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socio-economic outcomes (Alesina and Giuliano 2016; Tabellini 2006). Most institutional
literature, tend to focus on the effects of formal institutions (such as democratic elections)
on poverty or informal institutions on poverty separately. This paper adds to literature
by arguing that certain group identities (i.e., class identity of the poor) are important for
formal institutions to be effective in improving poverty outcomes.
The paper begins by explaining the background of Brazil’s oil history. The next
section explains the theory and why Brazil is an appropriate case study. Further sections
introduce the empirical strategy and the data on the all variables. The results section
provide analyses of the effects of (i) oil revenue on poverty, (ii) ethnic heterogeneity
and (iii) ethnic heterogeneity of the poor on oil revenue and poverty in Brazil. Finally,
the discussion and conclusion sections summarize the paper’s findings, shortcomings and
implications for future research.
4.2 Historical Background
Since 1939, Brazil has extracted oil. The number of onshore oilfield finds peaked in the
1980s and then dwindled. Offshore oil extracting, however, was a much more recent
phenomenon and accounts for the vast majority of oil output today. In the early 1970s,
offshore oilfields grew rapidly, declined in the 1990s and then significantly grew again
in the 2000s. As a price taker of world oil prices, Brazil’s oil sector accounted for ap-
proximately 2 percent of the world oil production, 1 percent of world oil reserves, and 2
percent of Brazilian GDP since 2005 (Caselli and Michaels 2013). Oil in Brazil is linked
to Petrobas, the oil multinational controlled by the federal government, which completely
dominates the industry. The oil sector is heavily regulated. The industry regulator is
Agencia Nacional do Petroleo, Gas Natrual e Bicombustiveis (ANP). One of the impor-
tant functions of the ANP is to oversee the calculation of royalties due on each oilfield,
collect the payment, and distribute it to the various recipients.
In recent decades, fiscal reforms were implemented to distribute oil royalties to
municipal governments. Prior to the reforms, offshore oil revenue benefited the federal
government only. In 1985, during the democratization and decentralization period, Law
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7.453/85 was enacted and offshore revenue began to be paid to municipalities (Monteiro
and Ferraz 2012). With the enactment of Oil Law in 1997, oil companies were mandated
to pay from 5 to 10 percent of output value in royalties to federal, state and local govern-
ments and indexed the reference price to the oil international oil prices (Monteiro and Fer-
raz 2012). Previously, oil revenue were calculated based on refining prices, which used to
be controlled by the government. In addition, the law created special quotas or extra pay-
ments received from highly productive oil fields (Monteiro and Ferraz 2012). The second
parcel of 5 percent royalty payments followed a different rule than the previous one and
benefited producing municipalities even more so (Monteiro and Ferraz 2012). Following
the new legislation, there was an exponential increase in world oil prices and production.
Due to the discovery of enormous offshore oil reserves, oil output more than doubled be-
tween 1996 and 2012, from 795 to 2,061 barrels a day (Bhavnani and Lupu 2016). Since
oil prices in Brazil are linked to world prices, oil revenue increased significantly. Royalty
payments to municipalities increased from 0.4 billion in 1999 to 2.8 billion U.S. dollars
in 2010 (Postal and Nishijima 2013). Municipal governments that benefited the most saw
on average their budgets increase by three-fold in real terms between 1997 and 2000, and
then double from 2000 and 2004 (Monteiro and Ferraz 2012).
To determine which municipalities were affected by offshore oil production, polit-
ical elites developed a geographic criteria and classified municipalities into four groups:
producing municipalities, secondary zones, neighbouring municipalities and non-affected
municipalities (Caselli and Michaels 2013). The largest share of oil revenue that goes to
municipalities is paid to producing municipalities because they are considered the ones
most affected by oil production1. Producing municipalities are classified as those that lie
in front of an oil well according to orthogonal and parallel lines to the Brazilian coast (De-
cree 93.189/86). These lines were not the object of political bargain since, by law, they
were designed by the National Bureau of Statistics (IBGE) based on the geodesic lines or-
thogonal to the Brazilian coast which are used as reference in nautical letters (Caselli and
Michaels 2013). Neighbouring municipalities are also allocated oil royalties but to a lesser
1Ten states produce oil in Brazil but production is highly concentrated in Rio de Janeiro, which is
responsible for 92 percent of offshore or 82 percent of Brazilian oil output (Caselli and Michaels 2013)
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degree. The allocation royalty payments is determined by their proximity to producing
municipalities and other non-geographic factors such as the location infrastructure for the
storage and transportation of oil and gas, those affected by such operations and municipal
population size (Ardanez 2012; Caselli and Michaels 2013). As a result of these criteria,
royalty payments are largely concentrated in some coastal states and municipalities.
Municipal governments have a lot of room to spend oil royalties. Before 1997,
only investments in environment, energy, sewage and roads were allowed (Postali and
Nishijima 2013). Since the new legislation, municipal governments invested much of their
oil royalties on basic education, health, local transportation and infrastructure. Municipal
governments, however, cannot use oil revenue to hire public employees on a permanent
basis, nor can they use royalties to pay debts (Monteiro and Ferraz 2012). Moreover,
security is supplied by the state governments and few Brazilian municipalities have local
police (Monteiro and Ferraz 2012). In addition to the fiscal reforms, citizens were granted
greater political rights to influence local government policy. The Brazilian constitution
in 1998 established municipal governments as a third tier of government (Article 18).
Municipalities were given the same status as members of the federation, sharing the same
rights and duties of states (Afonso and Arau´jo 2007). Every municipal government holds
its own elections. The mayor and the municipal council members are selected directly by
the voters for a four-year term and the mayor can be re-elected only once (Afonso and
Arau´jo 2007). Municipal council members are elected through an open-list proportional
representation system (Afonso and Arau´jo 2007).
Collective Action, Social Identity and Poverty in Brazil
There is considerable political economy literature arguing that natural resources revenue
may greater levels of rent seeking political and economic elites and the inefficient distri-
bution of public resources, in turn, would lead to worse poverty outcomes (Ross 2015).
High levels of resource revenues could forestall the state capacity of local governments
to extract taxes from its citizens, which undermines the government’s capacity to to curb
rent-seeking behaviour (Ross 2015). In Brazil, Brollo et al. (2013) use a regression dis-
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continuity design to identify the effects of transfers from federal government to municipal
governments; they found that a 10 percent rise in windfall transfers is associated with a 10
to 12 percentage points increase in corruption found by the federal government’s random
audit program. Caselli and Michaels (2013) use a similar ’natural expertiment’ approach
to this paper and found that oil revenues were associated with higher spending in pub-
lic goods and services and yet much of the money went missing and was most likely to
absorbed by a combination of increased patronage and embezzlement by political elites.
To mitigate the negative rent-seeking effects of resource revenue transfers, some
scholars argue that collective action of citizens is an important factor (Paler 2013). The
general idea is that if citizens organize and electorally pressure political elites to allocate
oil revenue that improve general welfare instead of benefiting subgroups at the expense
of the public; then citizens would establish the credible threshold to effectively influence
government policy. There are many obstacles, however, that may hinder the poor from
successful organization. Olson (1965), for example, notes the difficulty of large groups,
such as the poor, of collectively acting because the costs of each individual contributing
to the group is likely to outweigh the individual benefits. Thus, it would be rational for
individual members to free ride from the efforts of others.
Experimental studies in social psychology show, however, that individuals identify
whom strongly identify with a group that they find themselves most similar with, those in-
dividuals tend to receive positive utility when in-group members benefit while remaining
partial or even receive negative utility when out-group members benefit (Costa-Font and
Cowell 2013; Shayo 2009; Tajfel et al. 1974). That is, individuals, in addition, to their
improving their own utility, they also care about improving the general utility of their
group. One implication of the theory is that if poor citizens identify strongly with their
class group, then they are more likely to organize and pressure political elites to improve
the general welfare of the poor. Since class identification is largely determined by where
the group is relatively positioned within an income distribution, it would be plausible to
argue that the poor would organize and pressure political elites for higher levels of redis-
tribution and provision of public goods and services. Indeed, Shayo (2009) developed a
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formal model and found a positive correlation between poor citizens that identify strongly
with their class group and redistributive preferences in advanced democracies.
One of the major hindrances to strong class identification is ethnic heterogeneity.
The reasoning is that ethnic identity is likely to increase the social distance between in-
dividual members within a group. Ethnic characteristics, tend to be more observable
and easily identifiable than class and individuals often, although not necessarily, develop
norms of behaviour, language and social network based on ethnic lines (Berge et al. 2015;
Habyarimana et al. 2007). Luttmer (2001) provides evidence that individuals are more
likely to support redistribution as the share of local recipients from their own racial group
rises and found a negative correlation between the level of racial heterogeneity and re-
distribution in the United States. Shayo (2009) found a negative correlation between
higher ethnic minority share of the poor and support for redistribution across 33 advanced
democracies. Instead of class cohesion and collective action, there is strong evidence to
suggest that collective action based on ethnic lines leads to worse political accountability
and policy outcomes for the poor (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Kuijs 2000). When the poor
are ethnically heterogeneous and collectively acting based on ethnic lines, they are likely
to compete and vote for political elites that provide patronage goods and private rents that
benefit their ethnic group; excluding other members of the poor. What results is under-
provision of public goods and services that would improve general welfare of the poor
such as universal healthcare, quality schools and a higher provision of patronage goods
such as government jobs which leads to an inefficient distribution of resources (Alesina
et al. 2003; 2005; Easterly and Levine 1997; Glaeser and Saks 2006; Kuijs 2000).
Brazil is a suitable case study to test the effects of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor
on oil revenues on poverty outcomes. For one thing, Brazil is an ethnically heterogeneous
country. The population is comprised of 49.7 percent white, 42.6 percent mixed race, 6.9
percent black, 0.5 percent are Asian and 0.3 percent are indigenous in 2006 (Brazilian
Ministry of Education 2008). Of the indigenous minority, there are 228 different groups
speaking about 180 languages (Afonso and Arau´jo 2007). Unlike South Africa, where
race was defined by descent and certified in legal records, there was no such clear cut
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line in Brazil. (Skidmore 1992). Ethnic category was defined by factors such as physical
appearance, apparent station in life, and ancestry (Skidmore 1992). In addition, there are
considerable and persistent socio-economic inequalities between ethnic groups implying
there are further differences between groups. From 1940, censuses have shown dispari-
ties between the white and non-white populations in education, vocational achievement,
earnings, and life expectancy (Andrews 1996). According to the 1999 national house-
hold survey; Blacks represent 70 percent of the poorest decile of Brazilians and make
up only 15 percent of the richest2. The average 25 year old Brazilian has an average
8.4 years of schooling, a black Brazilian of the same age has 6.1 years; and 52 percent
among blacks live in households without adequate sanitation compared to 28 percent
whites (Htun 2004).
Brazil did not have the legal segregation and discrimination of the United States
and South Africa, Brazilians, however, tend to socially segregate themselves by ethnic-
ity. Telles (1992) analyze the 1980 Brazilian census and noted that whites are generally
more segregated from blacks than from browns, both overall and within income groups,
and blacks and browns are strongly segregated from each other (Telles 1992). The Black
Brazilians who do manage to integrate themselves into a residential area often experience
a high degree of social isolation and ostracism (Hernandez 2004). This is likely the re-
sult of implicit racism. Survey research has shown that racist attitudes and stereotypes of
blacks and browns are pervasive (Andrews 1996). Though there are no explicit quantita-
tive studies on the effects of ethnic heterogeneity on cooperation, political accountability
and public goods provisions in Brazil, the country’s history suggest that ethnic politics
plays an important role. When Brazil transitioned to democracy in the late 1970s, numer-
ous ethnic-based organizations emerged such as the Moviemento Negro Unificado (Lovell
2005). Lovell (2005) argues that in other Latin American country, has ”black” political
mobilization merged so strongly. These previous studies provide plausible reason to be-
lieve that ethnic identification is prominent in Brazil and that it may have undermined the
necessary class cohesion for poor Brazilians to political pressure their local governments
2The Brazilian government classifies ethnic categories by black, brown, white, yellow and indigenous
in their censuses
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to provide public resources to improve their general welfare.
H1: Higher ethnic heterogeneity of the poor negatively affects the effect of oil rev-
enue on poverty
4.3 Empirical Strategy
I analyze two models. The first directly examines the effects of oil revenue on poverty
with a random effects panel model for coastal Brazilian districts with offshore oil and
those without oil of any kind from 1999-2012. Specifically, I estimate with the following
model:
yit = a+ zt +B1OilRevenueit +B2Controlsit + eit (4.1)
I model poverty yit in AMC3 municipalit and year t as a function of independent
variables OilRevenueit as well as the constant a, year effects zt and controlsit are ge-
ographic controls: latitude, longitude, distances from federal and state capitals, a state
capital dummy, and state fixed effects, log of population and eit is the error term.. The
coefficient B1 provides information on the average effect of oil revenue on poverty. Oil
revenue, however, is not exogenous to local characteristics and shocks because the alloca-
tion of the revenue also depends on the geographic proximity to an oil field, population,
and the location of oil facilities. It is likely that the decision to locate oil plants may well
be determined by the ability of locals to organize themselves and lobby their governments
for such an investment. For this reason, I instrument oil revenues by oil output (zit). The
purpose behind the instrumental variable approach is to isolate the average effect of oil
revenue due to oil output only. The validity of the instrumental variable approach de-
pends on two main assumptions. First, the instrument zit has a significant effect on the
endogenous variable of interest x1it and second, the only effect of the instrument zit on
the dependent variable yit is through the endogenous variable x1it (the exclusion restric-
tion). The first assumption is validated by the royalty rules since a fraction of oil output is
3The definition of AMC partitions are explained later in the section
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paid in royalties and thus generates a strong first stage. Caselli and Michaels (2013) and
Monteiro and Ferraz (2012) have already shown the strong effects of oil output on oil and
municipal revenues4.
The second main assumption requires that oil output only affect poverty through
oil revenue at the local level. Though this assumption is impossible to prove, there is
substantial evidence to argue that it is highly probable. It is plausible to argue that oil
output is exogenous to local characteristics and local shocks when conditioned under
geographic covariates. Caselli and Michaels (2013) show that oil output is good as ran-
domly assigned conditional on geographic covariates such as state fixed effects, longitude,
latitude, distance to federal capital, distance to state capital, state-capital dummies, and
coastal dummies. They regressed oil output in 2000 on various local socio-economic out-
comes in 1970 and found that oil output is generally uncorrelated with those variables
(Caselli and Michaels 2013). Since much of the oil production is determined by a giant
multinational oil company, Petrobas, it is unlikely that their specialized equiment and la-
bor force are influenced by local characteristcs. As Caselli and Michaels (2013; p.12)
describe, the oil fields are operated through gigantic rigs located many miles away from
the coast and the municipalities that receive oil revenue. Production may vary over time
due to the discovery of new oil fields and international prices but it is unlikely to be de-
termined by government or citizens of municipalities. Further, they (2013) examined the
effect of gross oil output on municipal GDP, industrial GDP, and non-industrial GDP in
2002. They infer that any effect from oil likely arises from the revenues it brings to the
municipal government.
The second model examines the effects of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor on the
effect of oil revenues on poverty with a random effects panel model for coastal Brazilian
districts with and without offshore oil from 1999-2012. Specifically, I estimate with the
following model:
4The first stage regression in the Appendix also show a strong and significant effect of oil output on oil
revenue
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yit = a+zt+B1OilRevenueit+B2EFit+B3(OilRevenueit∗EFit)+B4Controlsit+eit
I model poverty yit in AMC municipal i and year t as a function of independent
variables OilRevenue and EF as well as the constant a, year effects zt and controlsit
are the same geographic controls from model one. The coefficient B3 informs the effects
of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor on the effect of oil revenues on poverty. Since oil
revenue is likely to be endogenous, the interaction term is likely to be endogenous as well.
For that reason, oil revenue and the interaction term Oilrevenue ∗ EF are instrumented
by oil output and the interaction term Oiloutput ∗ EF . The unit of analysis is Brazilian
areas minimas comparaveis (AMCs) and not the usual municipal boundaries. AMCs are
constructed by the Instituto de Pesquisa Economic Aplicada (IPEA). Each AMC contains
one municipality or more, and the area of each AMC remains relatively stable as the
municipality boundaries change (Caselli and Michaels 2013). There are some advantages
to using AMC municipal partitions over the standard ones. One is that it addresses the
endogenous splitting of municipalities. The number of Brazilian municipalities increased
over time because of splitting. There is evidence that the splitting process may have
been driven by a desire to game the royalty-allocation scheme (Brandit 2002; Caselli
and Michaels 2013). Further, this fragmentation makes it difficult to test for random
assignment of oil at the municipality level since current municipalities did not exist before.
The AMC partition reproduces municipality boundaries in 1970, before the process of
offshore-oil discovery (Caselli and Michaels 2013). It is therefore immune to the potential
endogenous splitting problem. Overall, more than 5,500 municipalities that exist today
are pooled into 3,659 AMCs.
The sample is restricted to only coastal municipalities. The reasoning is that munic-
ipalities on the coast are more likely to have similar characteristics before the upsurge of
offshore oil production and prices. 31 coastal AMC municipalities had offshore oil while
156 coastal AMCs do not have oil of any kind.
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4.4 Data
All of the variables are converted to AMC partitions. AMCs are constructed by the Brazil-
ian government’s Institute of Applied Economic Research and data on municipal and
AMC conversion were collected from there (IPEA).
Dependent Variables
Two measurements of poverty are used: infant and child mortality rates. Infant mortality
rate measures the annual number of infant deaths per 1000 live births. Child mortality
rate is the annual number of child deaths by the age of five, per 1000 live births. Infant
and child mortality rates are good measures because they reflect a wide range of factors
that are associated with extreme poverty. Some factors include the nutritional status and
health knowledge of mothers, the level of immunization and oral rehydration therapy, the
availability of basic health services, income and food availability in the family, the avail-
ability of safe drinking water and basic sanitation; and the overall safety of the children’s
environment, among others (UNICEF 2015). Such factors could be reduced by the im-
plementation of appropriate government services and goods such as infrastructure, health
and education services. Data on infant, child deaths and number of live births were from
the Brazilian Ministry of Health statistical agency (DATASUS 2016).
It is likely the case that the relationship between local government spending and
infant and child mortality rates is non-linear. That is, it is easier for governments to
reduce infant and child mortality rates when they are high compared to when they are
low. This implies that a one unit increase in oil revenue would have an equal absolute
changes in infant and child mortality rates which is unlikely the case. To account for this,
infant and child mortality rates are log transformed (Gerring et al. 2012). It is important
to note that some municipalities had 0 child deaths. As a consequence of log transforming
child mortality rates, 57 observations are dropped from the regressions in Table 4.1 that
include the direct effects of oil revenue and Table 4.2. which includes the interaction
model of ethnic heterogeneity and oil revenue. Only 2 observations are dropped from the
regressions in Table 4.3. which include the interaction model of ethnic heterogeneity of
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the poorest quantile and oil revenue. Since the sample sizes of the regressions are pretty
large (ranging from 2,309 to 1,592) and the number of dropped observations is relatively
small (especially in the main regression Table 4.3), I think the relatively small loss of
information is less of a concern than the possibility of a non-linear relationship. Further,
log transformations did not lead to any loss of observations in the regressions that include
infant mortality rates as the dependent variable.
Independent Variables
Data on royalty payments and oil output are disclosed monthly by the Brazilian Oil Na-
tional Agency (ANP). Since August 1998, it discloses monthly data on oil and gas pro-
duction and prices by oil field. I calculated annual oil output from 1999 to 2012 for each
oil field by using the following formula:
OilOutput = Oilprice ∗Oilproduction+GasPrice ∗GasProduction (4.2)
Oil and gas prices are calculated by averaging the monthly prices. Oil and gas pro-
duction are the total annual production by an oilfield. To allocate oil output of each oil
field to municipalities, I use the geographic component of the royalty-allocation formula.
That is, municipalities that are “facing” the oilfields are given a certain percentage of roy-
alty payment from oil output of each oilfield. With regard to offshore oil, Brazilian law
apportions the royalties based on the fraction of the oilfield that lies within each munic-
ipality borders’ extension on the continental shelf. Caselli and Guy (2013) allocated oil
output from each field to the various municipalities. I then sum over all the municipalities
in each AMC and divide by the sum of municipal populations to obtain oil output and
revenue per capita at the AMC level.
Oil output per capita and oil revenue per capita are inverse hyperbolic sine trans-
formed to account for the highly skewed distributions, high number of zero values and to
make interpretation easier (Friedline et al. 2014). Income data are known to be highly
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right skewed with difficult interpretation and often, researchers try to address these prob-
lems either using log transformation or running quantile regressions. The problem with
log transformations of income data is that a substantial portion of the municipalities have
no royalty or oil output income at all and the log of 0 is undefined. It is possible to drop
the observations with no income but that leads to throwing away information and ignor-
ing significant part of the population. Another solution is inputting a very small value
such as 1 dollar but that is arbitrary. Quantile regressions would lead to loss of varia-
tion within quantiles. For these methodological reasons, I use the inverse hyperbolic sine
transformation which is defined as:
= log(x+ (x2 + 1)1/2) (4.3)
With the exception of very small values of x, the inverse sine is approximately equal
to log(2x) or log(2) + log(x) (Burbidge et al. 1988). The transformation can be interpreted
the same way as a standard logarithmic variable. Assuming the regression is linear, a 1
percent increase in the independent variable is associated with a change in the outcome
variable. But unlike a log variable, the inverse hyperbolic sine is defined at zero (Burbidge
et al. 1998).
I use two measures of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor. The first is the well known
ethnic fractionalization (EF). It is constructed using the Herfindahl index:
EF = 1−
G∑
i=1
s2ij (4.4)
Similarly stated in the previous chapter, the variable measures the probability that
two random individuals will not belong to the same ethnic group. The variable subtracts
the sum square of the share of ethnic groups over the total population within a municipal-
ity. Where sij is the share of ethnic group i over the total population of the municipality
j and G is the number of ethnic groups. The measure increases as groups become more
equal in size independent of the number of groups. If all groups are of equal size, then the
municipality with a larger number of groups will have a higher index of heterogeneity.
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When EF is 0 there is complete homogeneity while 1 is complete heterogeneity. EF
measures the aggregate heterogeneity of a given geographic area but it does not account
for heterogeneity within class groups. This is a problem because the hypothesis states
that higher ethnic heterogeneity of the poor negatively affects the effect of oil revenues
on poverty rather than overall ethnic heterogeneity. For this reason, I construct an ethno-
wealth fractionalization index (EWF):
EWFk = 1−
G∑
i=1
s2ij (4.5)
The EWFk measure subtracts the sum square of the share of ethnic groups from a
class population rather than the total population within a municipality. In this case, sij is
the share of ethnic group i over a class population k (e.g. the poor) of the district j and
G is the number of ethnic groups. As a result, EWF is a variable that measures ethnic
heterogeneity of a class group rather than ethnic heterogeneity of a given society. To con-
struct the variable, I used the 2000 Brazilian census because it provides information on
individual private asset ownership and ethnicity. I proxy wealth using private ownership
of household assets rather than reported income or consumption expenditures. It is has
shown that income is hard to measure from surveys in developing countries because peo-
ple may not have reliable knowledge of their income or they choose not report it to the
government agency (Østby 2008). For this reason, the wealth asset index proxies wealth
by determining whether or not each individual has ownership of electricity, water sup-
ply, phone, sewage system, refrigerator, television, radio, car, air conditioning, computer,
washer, VCR, bathroom, radio and bathing facilities.
Principal component analysis is used (PCA) to proxy wealth through these house-
hold assets. PCA is a statistical technique that describes the variation of a set of multi-
variate data in terms of a set of uncorrelated linear combinations of the original variables
(Vyas and Kumaranayake 2006). Each consecutive linear combination is derived to ex-
plain as much of the variation in the original data as possible, while being uncorrelated
with other linear combinations (Vyas and Kumaranayake 2006). The asset index is the
first principal component or the first linear combination. The asset index was split into
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quantiles ranging from the poorest third; Q1 to the richest fifth; Q5. I then use the same
Herfindahl index to measure the level of ethnic fractionalization within the poorest quan-
tile. EWFQ1 represents ethnic heterogeneity of the poorest while EWFQ5 measures
the richest. Since the hypothesis states that oil revenue are less likely to improve poverty
outcomes when the poor are ethnically heterogeneous, EWFQ1 and EWFQ2 will be
used only because the variable represent ethnic heterogeneity of the poorest members
within the districts.
It is important to note that there is missing data for EWFQ1 and EWFQ2. This
not a problem for EF because information on the percentage of ethnic groups within
municipalities was already calculated and made publicly available by the Brazilian gov-
ernment. Information on both ethnicity and household assets, however, required the direct
use of census data. The Minnesota Population Center publicly provided the census data.
They, however, combined geographical units with relatively small populations. That is,
officially defined municipalities with populations less than 20,000 were combined with
neighbouring municipalities. This process is done primarily for maintaining confiden-
tially procedures and also allowing contiguity and similarity in population density. As
a result, EWFQ1 and EWFQ2 values are provided for only 126 out of the 185 AMC
municipalities.
The geographic variables such as latitude, longitude, distance to the state and fed-
eral capital and state dummies were collected from the Brazilian government’s Institute
of Applied Economic Research (IPEA 2016). Information on coastal dummies were cal-
culated by Caselli and Guy (2013). Income is included because the vast majority, if not
all studies, show that a strong and signification association between income and health
outcomes such as infant and child mortality rates (Ross 2006). Income is log transformed
because the effect of income from lows levels on infant and child mortality rates maybe
larger than compared to from high levels; implying that there is a diminishing marginal
returns to income and non-linear function form. Further, as the distribution is highly right
skewed, log transformations makes interpretation easier and all the values are positive.
Population density is included because it may be more difficult for public services to re-
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search sparse areas compared to relatively dense ones. Population and population growth
are also included as control variables because there is concern that oil discoveries in cer-
tain municipalities would attract migration which would dilute the benefits on a per-capita
basis. Moreover, it may affect the ethnic composition of the municipal population. Caselli
and Guy (2013) show that there is no significant effect of oil output on population. All
the population variables are log transformed for the similar reasons mentioned above on
income.
4.5 Results
Table 4.1: Oil Revenue and Poverty
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IMR-GLS CMR-GLS IMR-2SLS CMR-2SLS
Oil Revenue 0.0042 0.011 0.0072 0.011
(0.0079) (0.0077) (0.0090) (0.0088)
Constant 1.20 0.20 1.16 0.19
(0.86) (0.82) (0.86) (0.83)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,292 2,356 2,292 2,356
R2 0.24 0.27 0.24 0.27
Standard errors at the municipality level are in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Controls include EF, log of income, population, population density and geographic controls
Table 4.1 shows that the average marginal effects of oil revenue on the log of in-
fant and child mortality rates are not statistically significant for both the GLS and 2SLS
regressions. In columns 1 to 4, the positive coefficients suggest that increasing a mu-
nicipality’s oil revenue increases infant and child mortality rates for both the GLS and
2SLS regressions. R-squared state that the regressions explain 24 to 27 percent of the
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variation of infant and child mortality rates. To understand the conditional effects of oil
revenue varying on different levels of ethnic heterogeneity, a second set of regressions are
produced below.
Table 4.2: Ethnic Heterogeneity, Oil Revenue and Poverty
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IMR-GLS CMR-GLS IMR-2SLS CMR-2SLS
EF 0.21 0.29 0.20 0.27
(0.24) (0.22) (0.24) (0.23)
Oil Revenue 0.064 0.016 0.042 −0.023
(0.054) (0.057) (0.080) (0.078)
EF*Oil Revenue −0.12 −0.011 −0.077 0.068
(0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.15)
Constant 1.22 0.11 1.18 0.070
(0.94) (0.88) (0.93) (0.89)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,292 2,309 2,292 2,309
R2 0.24 0.31 0.24 0.31
Standard errors at the municipality level are in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
Controls include log of income, population, population density and geographic controls
Table 4.2 shows that the results are not statistically significant and the direction of
the coefficients are not consistent with the hypothesis. In columns 1 to 3, the results of
the regressions contradict the hypothesis. The positive coefficient of oil revenue indicate
that the effect of increasing a municipality’s oil revenue increases infant and child mor-
tality rates when municipalities are ethnically homogeneous (ethnic heterogeneity equals
zero) for both the GLS and 2SLS regressions. The positive effect attenuates as ethnic
heterogeneity increases and is indicated by the negative coefficient of the interaction term
EF ∗ OilRevenue. In column 4, the coefficient of OilRevenue suggest that increasing
a municipality’s oil revenue due to oil output decreases child mortality when they are
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completely ethnically homogeneous. The negative coefficient of OilRevenue indicates
that the effect of increasing a municipality’s oil revenue decreases child mortality rate
when municipalities are completely homogeneous. The negative effect attenuates as eth-
nic heterogeneity increases and is indicated by the positive coefficient of the interaction
term EF ∗ OilRevenue. None of the relevent coefficients are significant at the 95 per-
cent confidence levels. R-Squared states that the regressions explain 24 to 31 percent of
the variation of infant and child mortality rates within the models. To get a better un-
derstanding of the conditional effects of oil revenue varying on different levels of ethnic
heterogeneity, graphs of the marginal effects are produced below.
Figure 4.1: Oil Revenue, Ethnic Heterogeneity and Poverty
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Figure 4.1. shows the conditional effects of democracy on infant and child mortal-
ity rates at varying levels of ethnic heterogeneity.The majority of the graphs show that
increasing a municipality’s oil revenue either increases or has no effect on infant and
child mortality rates for most levels of ethnic heterogeneity. The conditional effects of
oil revenue are not statistically significant for any level of ethnic heterogeneity. These
regressions, however, provide information only on the ethnic heterogeneity of the whole
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municipality population rather than heterogeneity within class groups. For that reason,
another set of regressions that include ethnic heterogeneity of the poorest quantile are
produced.
Table 4.3: Ethnic Heterogeneity of the Poorest Quantile, Oil Revenue and Poverty
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IMR-GLS CMR-GLS IMR-2SLS CMR-2SLS
EWFQ1 0.15 −0.0080 0.13 −0.024
(0.22) (0.24) (0.22) (0.24)
Oil Revenue −0.069 −0.040 −0.087 −0.055
(0.046) (0.049) (0.050) (0.053)
EWFQ1*Oil Revenue 0.13 0.089 0.16 0.12
(0.083) (0.088) (0.090) (0.097)
Constant 1.90∗ 0.80 1.87∗ 0.77
(0.95) (1.02) (0.96) (1.03)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,592 1,593 1,592 1,593
R2 0.31 0.37 0.31 0.37
Standard errors at the municipality level are in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Controls include EF, log of income, population, population density and geographic controls
Table 4.3 shows that at higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor, oil rev-
enue is associated with worse infant and child mortality. The results, however, are not
statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence levels. In the first two columns with
the GLS regressions, the negative coefficients on OilRevenue indicate that the effect of
increasing a municipality’s oil revenue reduces infant and child mortality rates when the
poor are ethnically homogenous (EWFQ1 equals zero). The negative effect, though,
attenuates as ethnic heterogeneity of the poor increases. This is indicated by the posi-
tive coefficient on EWFQ1 ∗ OilRevenue. In columns 3 and 4 that include the 2SLS
regressions, the negative coefficients on OilRevenue indicate that the effect of increas-
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ing a municipality’s oil revenue due to oil output reduces infant and child mortality rates
when the poor are ethnically homogenous. The negative effect, though, attenuates as eth-
nic heterogeneity of the poor increases which is indicated by the positive coefficient on
EWFQ1 ∗OilRevenue. The R-Squared states that the regressions explain 31 to 37 per-
cent of the variation in infant and child mortality rates. To provide further information
on the conditional effects of democracy on infant and child mortality rates across varying
levels of ethnic heterogeneity, marginal effect graphs of the relationships are produced
below.
Figure 4.2: Oil Revenue, Ethnic Heterogeneity of the Poorest Quantile and Log IMR and
CMR
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Figure 4.2. shows insignificant results of the conditional effects of oil revenue on
infant and child mortality rates at varying levels of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor though
they substantively the support the hypothesis. On the upper two quadrants when ethnic
heterogeneity is at the minimum level 0, oil revenue decreases infant and child mortality
rates. When ethnic heterogeneity is at the maximum level around 0.7, oil revenue de-
creases infant and child mortality rates. On the lower two quadrants with IV estimates,
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the graphs show a similar relationship. The conditional effect of oil revenue on infant and
child mortality, however, are not statistically sigificant at the 95 percent confidence levels
at any relevant level of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor.
4.5.1 Additional Models and Robustness
For further analysis, I produce regressions on the effect of oil revenue on poverty condi-
tioned by ethnic heterogeneity of the second poorest quantile. The results are similar to
the regressions with ethnic heterogeneity of the poorest quantile. Although the point esti-
mates change a bit, the results generally show that at higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity
of both poorest and second poorest quantiles, oil revenue is associated worse infant and
child mortality outcomes. Figure 4.3 show that the conditional effects of oil revenue on
infant and child mortality rates are not statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence
levels at any relevant level of ethnic heterogeneity of the second poorest quantile.
4.6 Discussion and Conclusion
The results show that the conditional effects of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor on the
effect of oil revenue on poverty are not statistically significant. The first set of regres-
sions in Table 4.1 directly examine the effects of oil revenue on log of infant and child
mortality rates. Confirming previous studies, all of the results suggest that that oil rev-
enue does not have a significant effect on infant and child mortality rates. The next two
sets of regressions tell a more nuanced story. In Table 4.2, the effects of ethnic hetero-
geneity on the effect of oil revenue on poverty are not statistically significant and are not
consistent with the hypothesis. Most of the results suggest that at higher levels of ethnic
heterogeneity, oil revenue is associated with better infant and child mortality outcomes;
contradicting the hypothesis. Only one of the regressions showed that at higher levels of
ethnic heterogeneity, oil revenue is associated with worse infant and child mortality. The
regressions in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 and their subsequent marginal effect graphs show that
the effect oil revenue on infant and child mortality rates are not statistically significant at
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the 95 percent confidence levels for any of the relevant values of ethnic heterogeneity of
the poor. The direction of the consistents, however, indicate that at higher levels of ethnic
heterogeneity of the poor, oil revenue is associated with better infant and child mortality
outcomes. The direction of the coefficients are shown to be consistent for both measures
of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor and for both the GLS and 2SLS regressions.
In terms of the validity of the results, there are several important possible endo-
geneity issues to address. First, Tables 4.1 and 4.2 include the near full sample of coastal
AMCs with and without offshore oil production while Table 3 is a partial sample. The
Minnesota Population Center that provided the census data on private assets and ethnic-
ity combined neighbouring municipals with populations less than 20,000 together (2016).
This is an issue because it removes additional information. Second, there are public bud-
get and civil service issues with using AMC partitions rather than municipalities. Some
AMCs are split in two or three municipalities. The sum of AMC measures compare the
municipal budget of one municipality in 1991 with the sum of three municipal budgets
in 2000 or later (Monteiro and Ferraz 2012). The issue that is the sum of two or three
budgets is probably larger than the statistically constructed one. Although this could lead
to errors in the measure, the endogenous splitting of municipalities is the bigger issue. It
is highly likely that some coastal municipalities split to gain more oil revenue which may
confound the results (Caselli and Michaels 2013).
Though this is an issue, I believe it is better to use AMC partitions because those
partitions allow researchers to test for random conditional assignment. Since offshore
production grew from early 1970s and the AMC partitions are the municipal boundaries
in 1970, it is possible to test whether there were significant differences of local charac-
teristics between oil rich and oil poor municipalities except for geographic characteristics
before the upsurge in offshore oil production. Caselli and Michaels (2013) regressed oil
output in 1970 on socio-economic outcomes in 2000 and found no significant differences.
By using AMC partitions, it can be shown that conditioned on geographic characteristics,
oil output is exogenous to local characteristics such as poverty or ethnic heterogeneity.
There, however, is still the endogeneity issue of ethnic heterogeneity. The exponential
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increase in offshore oil output and revenues may have affected migration between munic-
ipalities and therefore, the ethnic composition of those populations. To account for this,
the regressions include controls for population size and growth. It is plausible that they
have no captured all of the possibile endogeneity issues of migration. But, the fact that
Caselli and Michaels (2013) found no significant effect of oil output on population may
provide some comfort.
Though the results do not statistically support the hypothesis, future studies with
improved research design may help scholars understand the the effects of group identity
of citizens on government spending and poverty alleviation. Studies that focus only on the
effects of formal institutions such as elections or transparency laws on poverty alone is not
likely to be sufficient. Previous studies have suggested that greater levels of information
and education of citizens improves the likelihood that citizens will monitor and sanction
rent-seeking behaviour of political and economic elites. In addition, it may be useful to
to examine how different types of group identities such as ethnic or class affect collective
action of the poor. This paper focused on ethnic differences, but it would be interesting to
also examine the effects of linguistic distances (Desmet al. 2009). Some languages tend
to be further apart than others and this may increase communication costs and negatively
affect cooperation. Further, the hypothesis could be extended to examine how ethnic
and linguistic heterogeneity affect other intergovernmental transfers and windfalls such
as foreign aid.
Finally, if it is the case that ethnic and linguistic differences affect collective action
and government spending, then understanding how to mitigate the effects of ethnic and
cultural heterogeneity may improve poverty outcomes. There is substantial evidence to
suggest that Brazilians social segrege and disassociate along ethnic lines. Language, edu-
cation and residential policies could improve cooperation by forming a common identity.
Some governments, such as those in Tanzania implemented policies to promote national
and socio-economic identities with reasonably successful results (Miguel 2004). Further
research into policies that promote a common identity and thereby facilitate collective
action among the poor could lead to greater insight on how to mitigate rent-seeking be-
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havour and improve the allocation of public resources to the poor.
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4.7 Appendix
Table 4.4: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Log IMR 2.78 0.49 0.25 4.62 2473
Log CMR 1.56 0.52 -0.86 3.43 2492
Oil Revenue pc 86.85 490.80 0 8411.35 2541
Oil Output pc 3165.19 34132.75 0 1300000 2541
EF 0.43 0.14 0.03 0.63 2541
EWFQ1 0.49 0.12 0 0.69 1721
EWFQ2 0.48 0.11 0.10 0.66 1721
EWFQ3 0.47 0.12 0.09 0.62 1721
EWFQ4 0.46 0.14 0.08 0.62 1597
EWFQ5 0.37 0.17 0 0.60 1307
Log Income 2.23 2.18 -5.09 9.84 2541
Log Population Density 3.82 1.47 -0.87 8.47 2541
Log Population 10.09 1.25 7.23 14.98 2541
Population Growth 0.54 10.85 -45.40 72.69 2356
Longitude 42.00 5.31 34.81 53.37 2541
Latitude -14.48 9.84 -33.52 3.84 2541
State Capital Dummy 0.04 0.21 0 1 2541
Distance from Federal Capital 1360.19 333.28 885.41 2212.7 2541
Distance from State Capital 105.17 103.41 0 576.93 2541
State Dummy 8.74 4,47 0 1 16
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Table 4.5: First Stage Model
IHS of Oil Revenue
IHS of Oil Output 0.50∗∗∗
(0.0079)
Constant 7.03∗∗∗
(2.32)
Controls Yes
State and Year FE Yes
Observations 2,356
R-Squared 0.89
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.6: Ethnic Heterogeneity of the Second Poorest Quantile, Oil Revenue and Poverty
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IMR-GLS CMR-GLS IMR-2SLS CMR-2SLS
EWFQ2 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.25
(0.26) (0.28) (0.27 (0.28)
Oil Revenue −0.037 −0.053 −0.051 −0.049
(0.054) (0.057) (0.065) (0.068)
EWFQ2*Oil Revenue 0.067 0.11 0.088 0.11
(0.098) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12)
Constant 1.86 0.64 1.87 0.65
(0.97) (1.03) (0.98) (1.04)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,592 1,593 1,592 1,593
R2 0.31 0.37 0.31 0.37
Standard errors at the municipality level are in parentheses, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
Controls include EF, log of income, population, population density and geographic controls
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Figure 4.3: Oil Revenue, Ethnic Heterogeneity of the Poorest Quantile and Poverty
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the effects of ethnic heterogeneity of the
poor on the effect of democratic institutions and public spending on poverty. In chapters 2
and 3, I examine the effect of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor on the effect of democracy
on poverty at the cross-national level and at the district level in Indonesia. In chapter
4, I test the assumption that higher public spending associated democracies compared to
non-democracies should lead to better poverty outcomes. Local governments in Brazil
provide a unique case study because substantial portions of their revenues are determined
by taxing the exogenous increase in offshore oil output and it is an ethnically heterogenous
country. This provided the opportunity to examine the effect of ethnic heterogeneity of
the poor on local public spending from oil revenues on poverty outcomes. By developing
unique research designs to test the hypothesis across different geographic areas, I am
more able to determine whether the effects of ethnic heterogeneity on democracy and
public spending could be inferred beyond one region or significant characteristic such as
only focusing on democracies in Southeast Asia or only focusing on rich democracies.
In chapter 2, the direction of the relevant coefficients indicate that at higher levels of
ethnic heterogeneity of the poor, democracy is associated with worse poverty outcomes.
Those relationships, however, are not statistically significant. Thus, it is not clear if the
lack of statistical significance is result of notable endogeneity issues addressed in the
discussion and conclusion sections such as measurement error, influence of unobserved
heterogeneity and reverse causality or that the hypothesis is wrong. The direction of
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the coefficients and the notable endogeneity issues suggest that a more rigorous study is
necessary to test the hypothesis. To improve internal validity, the subsequent chapters use
‘natural experiments’ and take advantage of higher quality data at the intra-country level.
In chapter 3, I examine the effect of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor on the effect of
elections on poverty at the district level in Indonesia. The study takes advantage of a natu-
ral experiment that arose because of the (exogenous) way Indonesian district government
transitioned to local elections. That is, the timing of local elections was determined by the
end term of the previous local leader whom were handpicked by an authoritarian regime
rather than local economic and social characteristics such as poverty or ethnic heterogene-
ity. In addition, Indonesia is a highly ethnically heterogeneous country with high-quality
data available due to the laborious efforts of the Indonesian government and the World
Bank. This provided an opportunity to construct the first ethno-wealth fractionalization
variables that directly measure the level of heterogeneity of the poor using census data.
Thus, the results in this study are less susceptible to endogeneity issues of the chapter 2
and can be measured more accurately. For most part, the results suggest that local elec-
tions are associated with worse poverty outcomes and public service delivery to the poor
when the poor are ethnically heterogeneous. The results held for multiple measures of
ethnic heterogeneity of the poor including regressions controlling for migration.
In chapter 4, I examine the effect of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor on local public
revenues from taxing offshore oil outputs at the municipality level in Brazil. The assump-
tion in this study is that since local governments went through substantial increases in
their budgets from the late 1990s to the early 2010s due to taxing exogenous increases
in offshore oil output, those governments had greater financial capacity to fund social
services that could improve poverty outcomes such as healthcare or education services.
As Brazil is a democratic country with large populations of poor people, it provided an
opportunity to test the effects of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor on local oil revenue on
poverty. The relevant coefficients indicate that at higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity of
the poor, oil revenue is associated with worse poverty outcomes. The relationships, how-
ever, are not statistically significant. The regressions with ethnic heterogeneity (rather
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than ethnic heterogeneity of the poor) produced results that are inconsistent with the hy-
pothesis and are not statistically significant. Similar with chapter 2, it is not clear if the
lack of statistical significance is due to endogeneity issues such as measurement error or
missing data from the way ethnic heterogeneity of the poor measures were constructed
or that the hypothesis is wrong. Overall, most of the results are not statistically signifi-
cant, particularly in chapters 2 and 4. In chapter 3, however, the study with the strongest
internal validity, most of the results are statistically significant.
There are several implications that could be drawn from the findings. To start, the
findings in chapter 3 suggest that using group identity in political economy models could
be analytically useful for understanding collective action and voting behaviour. This is
important because previous models such as Meltzer and Richard (1981) and Olson (1965)
assume that individuals are independent entities concerned only with maximizing their
own utility through income. Although these previous models are highly useful for their
simplicity, generalizability and clarity of their predictions and assumptions, there have
been too many cases where individuals have deviated from the predictions of those models
(Knack and Keefer 1997; Alesina and Glaeser 2004). This is not to imply that such
frameworks should be disregarded. Far from that, it is the belief of this author that these
models should be studied seriously. It is useful, however, to also draw insights from
sociology and psychology to understand the conditions by which individuals behave in
their self-interest or that of the group’s. Indeed, much of comparative politics and political
economy literature has already advanced in this direction (Hall and Lamont 2013). Shayo
(2009) particularly advanced the literature by providing a formal model to understand the
effects of various groups identities such as ethnicity, class and nationality have on the
redistributive preferences of individual voters in advanced democracies.
Regarding this dissertation’s findings, particularly in chapter 3, it might be the case
that individuals are more likely to behave in their economic self-interest if they also
strongly identify with their class group. Unlike other types of group identities, class
identity is based around the similar economic positions of a group of individuals. Indi-
viduals that are located at the lower end of the income distribution can generally classify
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themselves poor while those on the other end, tend to classify themselves as rich. If an
individual nests their own utility to that of their class group, then increasing one’s own
utility can align roughly with that of their group’s. Thus, in an environment of strong
class identification, it would make sense that poor individuals collectively act for higher
levels of redistribution and public goods provision because they cannot afford to privately
purchase those goods and serices while the rich can. In contrast, in societies where indi-
viduals are ethnically heterogeneous and ethnic identification is high, individuals may not
necessarily act in their economic interest. Unlike class, ethnic identity is not primarily
based on the economic positions of individuals but rather on cultural and ancestral ties.
Since there could be huge variation of wealth within an ethnic group, how would those
individuals determine an optimal economic policy for their ethnic group? The poor within
that ethnic group would benefit more from higher levels of redistribution and public goods
provision while the rich will benefit from less. The findings in chapter 3 suggest that even
democratic governments are less likely to make the poor better of when they are ethnically
heterogeneous.
Further, the findings in chapter 3 suggest that it may be useful to treat, at least, the
effect of democracy on poverty, if not other institutional variables, as a conditional rather
than as an unconditional one. Early quantitative studies that examine the average un-
conditional effects of democracy on poverty tend to miss out on important and necessary
nuances that make democracy an effective form of government. The more recent literature
in political economy emphasize that a certain sequencing may be necessary for democ-
racy to be effective. Particularly, democratic governments are more likely to be effective
if citizens are educated, there is a well-established free and independent press, high levels
of social capital and quality of government. By emphasizing those prerequisites, some
scholars argue the age of democracy is a better measure of the effects of democracy on
socio-economic outcomes rather than the level of democracy per se (Gerring et al. 2012).
Regarding this dissertation, I think it is also useful to include democracy as a part of an in-
teraction with another variable that measures relevant cultural characteristics of citizens.
In chapter 3, for example, the first set of regressions provide information on the average
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unconditional effect of local elections on poverty and public services. Those regressions
produced mixed results with small effect sizes. In the next sets of regressions the tim-
ing of local elections is treated as part of an interaction term and it’s marginal effects
are conditional at varying levels of ethnic heterogeneity and ethnic heteorgeneity of the
poor. The results of the conditional of elections on poverty outcomes are practically and
statistically significant for notable levels of ethnic heterogeneity measures. In the context
of Indonesia, framing the research question from “under what conditions are democratic
elections likely to reduce poverty?” provide more insightful information than phrasing,
“does democratic elections reduce poverty or not?”. Perhaps this explains why the results
from previous research on local elections on poverty, growth or other socio-economic
outcomes in Indonesia produced practically and statistically insignificant results.
Another implication is that developing new multi-dimensional measures of group
identity could be useful and would further the political economy literature. Though there
have been important efforts to create multi-dimensional measures of ethnicity and income
(Alesina et al. 2016; Baldwin and Huber 2010; Selway 2011; Shayo 2009), most stud-
ies on ethnic identity and poverty tend to use one-dimensional measures such as ethno-
linguistic fractionalization or polarization. I think that ethnic heterogeneity within class
groups could also provide useful information. In chapter 3, the effects of various measures
of ethnic heterogeneity of the poor on the effect of local elections on poverty in Indonesia
are practically and statistically significant. Shayo (2009) found that when the poor are
ethnically heterogeneous, they tend to weak preferences for redistribution in advanced
democracies. Further studies that create new measures of ethnic differences withinn class
groups may provide more information on how different group identities affect collective
action and institutional performance.
There are some notable limitations and implications for future research that could be
learned from this dissertation. First, measuring ethnic heterogeneity at the cross-national
level is very difficult. In chapter 2, I note that the problem is largely due to the lack of con-
sistent set of surveys that provide adequate information on ethnicity and income across
all regions. It is possible to create cross-national indices but the sample size will be lim-
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ited. For example, many scholars have used the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS)
funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). They pro-
vide quality surveys with decent sample sizes. The problem, however, is that those surveys
tend to focus on poorer countries. Thus, the effects of democracy must be inferred only
from those type of countries. Other scholars use government censuses compiled by orga-
nizations such as the Minnesota Population Center. Censuses tend to have large sample
sizes and adequate information on ethnicity, income, expenditure, private assets and edu-
cational attainment (which could be used to proxy wealth). The downside is the limited
global coverage and the inconsistent time periods. Most of the sample will tend to be rich
countries as those countries are most likely to have high quality statistical agencies and
data collection compared to poorer ones. Thus, resulting again in a biased sample.
Some researchers have used surveys from various sources such as Afro-barometer
and World Values Survey and aggregate those sources to construct group identity mea-
sures. The problem with that approach is that the data collection methods are likely to
be different across surveys which could lead to serious inconsistency issues in terms of
measuring ethnicity and income. Selway (2011) uses this approach and argues that he
overcame those problems but the challenges are still notable and perhaps insurmountable.
One of the most novel methods for measuring income of ethnic groups has been proxying
wealth with the level of luminosity within a geographic area. Using data that provides in-
formation of an ethnic groups and the corresponding level of luminosity within a specific
geographic region, Alesina et al. (2016) constructed measurements of inequality between
ethnic groups. This approach, however, measures at the group level, whereas to construct
a variable that measures ethnic heterogeneity within a income group and geographic area,
the individual must be the unit of analysis and not the group. Fortunately, from chapter
3 and 4, it is easier to measure ethnic heterogeneity of the poor at the intra-country level
due to quality census data. The issue, however, is that the results can only be inferred
from those countries.
Perhaps a more fundamental limitation is that measuring ethnicity is very difficult.
This dissertation assumes that ethnic groups are objective categories from which indi-
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viduals can classify themselves and that such classification is commonly shared and ex-
ogenous. This approach can lead to some notable shortcomings. First, people may not
agree on what are the relevant ethnic groups into which they are supposed to “classify”
others, i.e., the boundaries of these groups may be objectively known to all (Alesina and
La Ferrara 2005). In the context of census data, which are used heavily in chapters 3 and
4, ethnic affiliation can be a political charged issue (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). For
example, if the government is known to favour or hinder a given ethnic group, people
may have an incentive to report themselves as part of that group (Alesina and La Ferrara
2005). Secondly, even under the most conventional definition of ethnicity, the latter may
not be determined independently of economic and policy choices at a given point in time.
As Alesina and La Ferrara (2005; p. 23) note ”throughout history rulers have gone a long
way to influence (usually reduce ethnic diversity) using a variety of means, from the most
extreme ones, ethnic cleansing to subtler one, creating costs for various to stay”.
Third, ethnic heterogeneity measures may not necessarily account for the saliency
of ethnic identity or the degree of divisions between ethnic groups. The theory relies on
the assumption that an increasing number of ethnic identities increases the social distance
between members of the poor and thereby weaken collective action of that group, but it
might the case that other factors, such as group size, determine the social distance between
individuals. For example, Posner (2004) uses a “natural experiment” which originated
from the arbitrary drawing of the border between Zambia and Malawi to examine the
political saliency of two ethnic groups; the Chewas and Tumbukas. Posner (2004) argues
that there are divisions between the two ethnic groups in Malawi but not Zambia due to
the size of the groups rather than number of groups per se. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005;
p. 25) comment that from this study scholars can learn that, “there is nothing intrinsic
to physical differences or to the content of cultural traditions that should make a given
ethnic divide “salient” or not; rather, it is the structure of domestic political and economic
competitions that shapes potential ethnic divisions in meaningful realities”. Though the
results from this study can only be inferred from those two countries during that time,
it suggests that scholars should keep thinking more deeply on the conditions that ethnic
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competition and divisions occur.
Other measurements have been used to overcome the shortcomings of traditional
ethnic heterogeneity measures and to provide more information on the effects of other
types of social identities. Fearon (2003) created an index of cultural diversity based on
the assessment of the cultural distance between groups proxied by the differences in the
languages they speak. His plausible assumption is that linguistic similarity is a good
proxy of cultural similarity. If the poor are comprised of groups that speak very differ-
ent languages, then it will be difficult for them to organize or identify with one another
due to high communication costs. Studies so far have shown that linguistic and cultural
heterogeneity negatively affect redistribution and health outcomes (Desmet et al. 2009;
Fearon 2003). An extension of the present research would be to examine the effect of lin-
guistic heterogeneity and heterogeneity of the poor on the effect of formal institutions on
socio-economic outcomes. It would be also interesting to measure the cultural or linguis-
tic distances between class groups and examine the effects on redistribution and poverty
outcomes. Similar to Lupu’s and Pontussen’s study (2011), one could examine the degree
to with social distance and communication costs between class groups affect whether the
middle class would prefer to align with the poor or the rich.
Previously mentioned in chapter 2, another notable limitation is that the theory is
applied most appropriately in societies where the poor are the majority. The theory states
that ethnic heterogeneity undermines the class cohesion that is needed for the poor to
organize and pressure political elites to improve their welfare but it does not provide an
explanation for the middle and rich classes. If the middle and rich classes form a coali-
tion that compromises a majority, then collective action of the poor may not matter much.
This is less of an issue in developing democracies such as Indonesia or Brazil because
large portions of the population are poor. But it can be a serious issue in rich democracies
because substantial portion of the population is considered middle class rather than poor.
For example, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) found that welfare payments are less generous
in American states that have a higher proportion of minorities. They argue that the reason
there is less distribution is that the poor in the United States are likely to be comprised of
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minorities and the rich and middle class whom are in the majority group feel less com-
pelled to redistribute toward a group that are ‘different’ from them (Alesina and Glaeser
2004).
Moreover, the findings of this dissertation do not resolve the issue of whether class
or national identity is more effective for mitigating the negative effects of ethnic divisions.
Scholars have made compelling cases on why both national identity and class identity
are important. Regarding a common national identity, Singh (2015) draws from social
psychology literature to argue that promoting a common identity is conducive to collective
action of the poor and poverty reduction. Using the Group Identity Model, Singh (2015)
argues that if members of different groups (such as ethnic groups) are induced to conceive
themselves more as members of a single, superordinate group, attitudes toward former
out-group members will become positive through processes involving pro-in-group bias.
That is, a superordinate identity such as nationalism or sub-nationalism (identification
with one’s state) can mitigate the negative effects of ethnic heterogeneity on collective
action and public goods provision. In her study of Indian states, a country known for
high levels of ethnic heterogeneity, she provides evidence that sub-nationalism measured
as an index comprised of components such as common language, popular mobilization in
support of creation of the province as a political homeland, sub-national homeland and
the absence of a movement for the division of the province (Singh 2015).
Another interesting case study is the political and economic trajectories of Tanzania
and Kenya. Kenya and Tanzania are useful countries to compare due to the fact they are
similar in terms of geography, history and ethnic heterogeneity but dramatically differ
in nation-building policies (Miguel 2004). In Tanzania, political elites downplayed the
role of ethnic affiliation in public life and instead emphasized a single Tanzanian national
identity. Education policies were strongly employed to promote a common language
and identity through emphasizing a common Tanzanian history, culture and values. In
Kenya, by contrast, political elites encouraged ethnic differences and mobilized masses
based on ethnic cleavages. There is no common language policy, Swahili competes with
English and other minority languages. Nor are the education policies designed to em-
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phasize Kenyan unity. Miguel (2004) use a regression discontinuity design to examine
the effects of ethnic heterogeneity on public goods provision for two communities near
the Kenyan-Tanzanian border. He found that ethnic heterogeneity has no effect on pub-
lic goods provision in Tanzania while in Kenya, ethnic heterogeneity has a negative and
significant effect on public goods. From his study, he argues that policies that promote
a common national identity is a powerful method for mitigating the negative effects of
ethnic heterogeneity.
Contrasting those scholars, Shayo (2009) makes a compelling case that class iden-
tification leads to higher redistributive preferences of the poor than national identity. The
intuition of Shayo’s (2009) argument is that the more similar someone is with other mem-
bers of a group, the more likely the individual will identify with that group, and the
higher status the group is, the more likely an individual will identify with it. Class iden-
tification induces individuals to care about the welfare of their class group; in addition
to their own material payoffs. Therefore, the poor agent that identify with the poor class
will prefer higher levels of redistribution because it will improve the status of their class
group within an income distribution. National identification, on the other hand, may oc-
cur from variables that are not clearly related to redistribution or income such as culture.
Further, material payoffs of the rich members of the nation also affect national status. If
rich members of a nation are taxed heavily to redistribute to the poor than their status
will be lowered. Thus, to compromise for other factors that constitute national status and
the status of rich members, it would make sense that if the poor strongly identified with
the nation, they would generally prefer lower levels of redistribution compared to if they
strongly identified with their class.
It might be the case that certain national identities are more likely to mitigate
the negative effects of ethnic heterogeneity than others. The homogenizing nineteenth-
century French-style model of the monocultural nation state might be expected to reduce
ethnic diversity but an alternate equally influential model of the multicultural “nation
state”, exemplified by the eighteenth-century Britain and contemporary India, Belgium,
Spain and Canada recognizes that individuals can hold multiple identities and that eth-
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nocultural identification is not a threat to and might even strengthen superordinate alle-
giances (Singh 2015; p. 529-30). This unity-in-diversity model of nationalism would
thus not be expected to reduce ethnic diversity, but Singh (2015) argues might encourage
it. Shayo (2009) argues, however, that under certain conditions, national identification
can lead to more redistributive outcomes. If providing material payoffs to the poor is an
important component of national material payoffs, then a national identity could imply a
high level of redistribution as the rich and middle class are willing to redistribute to the
poor.
Another approach to address this issue is by arguing that a certain sequencing of
identification among citizens is necessary to promote collective action. That is, citizens
including the poor need to establish an inclusive national identification first and then class
identification to most effectively mitigate the negative effects of ethnic heterogeneity. The
Indian states Kerala and Uttar Pradesh are interesting cases studies because they possess
the same political and legal institutions and yet dramatically differ in poverty outcomes.
Kerala despite having a GDP per capita lower than the national average, has health out-
comes comparable to rich countries while Uttar Pradesh is comparable to Sub-Saharan
African countries Singh (2015). Singh (2015) argues that in Kerala, the influence of a
common identity promoted by early Christian missionaries and the new political elites
from 19th to early 20th century led to a fertile ground for communist parties in mid-
twentieth century to mobilize the poor based on class identity and interests. The emphasis
of a common identity among the Kerala citizens eroded the social distance between indi-
viduals who used to strongly identify by caste; thus, making class identification easier to
emerge. In Uttar Pradesh, in contrast, political elites decided to mobilize along caste lines
and not promote a common identity.
These studies, alone, cannot sufficiently resolve these issues. The generalizability
of Singh’s (2015) findings, although novel in terms of research design and theory, are
limited to India. Shayo’s (2009) findings are more generalizable and benefits from a plau-
sible formal model. The issue though is that his results are correlational at best and can
only be inferred from advanced democracies. The puzzle of whether national or class
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identity is more effective is not resolved by the findings of this dissertation either. The
results from chapter 3 suggest that ethnic heterogeneity, for the most part, negatively af-
fects the effect of local elections on poverty and public service delivery to the poor in
Indonesia. From these results, one could infer that a common identity such as a common
national or subnational identity could lead to more effective democratic institutions and
better poverty outcomes; supporting Singh’s (2015) argument of promoting a more super-
ordinate identity. The results, however, also show that ethnic heterogeneity of the poor
negatively affects the effect of local elections on poverty and public service delivery to the
poor as well. These results support Shayo’s (2009) general idea that ethnic heterogeneity
increases the social distance between members of the poor and as result negatively affects
the effect of democracy on poverty. Future research with better measurements and novel
research designs could elucidate our understanding on types of identity that mitigate the
negative effects of ethnic heterogeneity on the effectiveness of democratic governments
and public spending on poverty alleviation most effectively and whether there should be
certain sequencing for identification.
To conclude, this dissertation provides an additional explanation of why democratic
governments and public spending, sometimes, fail to the help the poor. While most pre-
vious research emphasize the importance of education, independent free press, electoral
rules and quality of government, this dissertation emphasize that ethnic heterogeneity
within the poor could be an important factor for understanding collective action and in-
stitutional performance. To test this hypothesis, I produce the first ethnic heterogeneity
within class group measures. By doing this, I argue the analytical usefulness of incorpo-
rating the conformity and in-group bias effects of group identity on individual behaviour
and to also treat the effects of democracy as conditional effects rather than average un-
conditional ones. Though the results of the cross-national and Brazil studies produced
insignificant results, the significant results from the Indonesia study suggest that further
research on the effects of group identity on individual behaviour on the effect of demo-
cratic performance could help scholars and their future to understand how to create more
effective institutions and reduce poverty.
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